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The “ILLEGAL” Tax
FRANCINE J. LIPMAN†
I. INTRODUCTION – “THE TRUTH WILL SET YOU FREE.”1
“Illegals do NOT pay taxes.” As a law professor researching and
writing about undocumented immigrants and their tax issues I see this
comment in my email inbox and hear it during outreach efforts routinely.
Every time I hear or read this or a similar comment, my whole body
cringes. This short statement truly embodies the exploitation of the
immigration debate.
While this statement is often delivered from mainstream individuals,
its origin can be traced to extremist rhetoric. Anti-immigrant and antiLatino extremists have used outright bigotry to frame the immigration
debate to advance their own supremacist agenda. By positioning
themselves as legitimate advocates against illegal immigration in America
these groups have broadened their base and mainstreamed their message.
These groups “are frequently quoted in the media, have been called to
testify before Congress, and often hold meetings with lawmakers and other
public figures.”2 As a result, in many American communities immigrants
live in fear and suffer a toxic environment in which hateful rhetoric
targeting immigrants has become an acceptable part of daily news and
discourse.3 How long will hate and prejudice thrive in America?
†

Visiting Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
This Article is dedicated to expanding the community of everyday heroes among us that stand up for
equality and justice for all by acting affirmatively against hateful acts of discrimination and intolerance.
“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is
the only thing that ever has.” Margaret Mead Sí, se puede. César Chávez and Dolores Huerta, everyday
heroes and co-founders of the United Farm Workers of America. See Sanjuana Martinez, Sí se puede :
el movimiento de los hispanos que cambiará a Estados Unidos (Mexico, D.F. : Grijalbo 2006).
1
John 8:32 (King James) (Jesus Christ in a conversation with his Jewish supporters) (“And ye
shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.”). Others have stated the following about “the
Truth;” “Truth is the breath of life to human society. It is the food of the immortal spirit.” Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr., Address to the Medical Graduates of Harvard University (Mar. 10, 1858); see
also Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Grosse Pointe High School (Mar. 14, 1968) (“I still believe
that freedom is the bonus you receive for telling the truth.”).
2
Immigrants Targeted: Extremists Move Into the Mainstream, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE 1
(2007),
http://www.adl.org/civil_rights/anti_immigrant/Immigrants%20Targeted%20UPDATE_2008.pdf.
3
See, e.g., Trip Gabriel & Edward Wyatt, At Rallies, 2 Candidates Deliver Blistering Attacks on
Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011(Herman Cain supporting the use of “real guns with real
bullets” and an electrified killer fence to stop illegal immigration); Ali Ismail, Draconian AntiImmigrant Law Stokes Fear Among Alabama’s Undocumented Population, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB
SITE (Oct. 10, 2011), www.wsws.org/articles/2011/oct2011/alab-o10.shtml (After the 2011 passage of
anti-immigrant laws in the state of Alabama, University of California, Davis, Dean and Immigration
Law Expert Kevin Johnson warned that “parents aren’t going to send students to schools because

94

CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:1

Almost fifty years ago in 1965, on the steps of the State Capital in
Montgomery, Alabama, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. asked a crowd of
twenty-five thousand “How long will prejudice blind the visions of men,
darken their understanding, and drive bright-eyed wisdom from her sacred
throne?”4 The crowd, celebrating the completion of the five-day, fifty-mile
march from Selma to Montgomery and their First Amendment Rights,
encouraged Dr. King to “speak, speak.” And he did answering his own
question with poetry, faith and optimism, “How long? Not long, because
the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”5
Following the many lessons of Dr. King’s passive resistance legacy, this
Article confronts insidious vilification and arrant racism with facts, laws,
and data.6
This Article will debunk the short, but maladroit statement that
“illegals do NOT pay taxes.” First, calling a group of people “illegals” is
hateful, “racially loaded, imprecise, and pejorative.”7 Scholars, and
children, understand that language and discourse can contribute to vile acts
including crime, abuse and other social problems.8 Historical and current
they’re going to be afraid of getting deported and it will chill them from executing a constitutional
right. I think undocumented immigrant communities feel vulnerable and threatened, and are very
fearful of ending up in deportation proceedings.”); Rena Havner Philips, After Immigration Ruling at
Foley School with Hispanic Population, Students Cry, Withdraw, No-Show, PRESS-REGISTER, Sept. 30,
2011, available at http://blog.al.com/live/2011/09/foley_elementary_students_pare.html (“Many of the
223 Hispanic students at Foley Elementary came to school Thursday crying and afraid, said Principal
Bill Lawrence. Nineteen of them withdrew, and another 39 were absent, Lawrence said, the day after a
federal judge upheld Alabama’s strict new immigration law.”); Cristina Costantini, Anti-Latino Hate
Crimes Rise As Immigration Debate Intensifies, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 18, 2011,
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/anti-latino-hate-crimes-rise-immigration_n_1015668.html
(describing numerous violent hate crimes including several murders against Latinos); SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CTR., CLIMATE OF FEAR, LATINO IMMIGRANTS IN SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y. 5, (Sept.
2009) (describing a growing national problem of violent hatred directed at all suspected undocumented
immigrants, but especially Latinos); see also SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., UNDER SIEGE, LIFE FOR
LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE SOUTH (2009) (describing hostility and discrimination as a staple for
Latinos in the south).
4
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Our God Is Marching On!” speech in Birmingham, Alabama
(March 25, 1965) (transcript available at http://www.mlkonline.net/ourgod.html).
5
Id.
6
See Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., “The Other America” speech at Grosse Point High School
(March 14, 1968) (“And I do not see how we will ever solve the turbulent problem of race confronting
our nation until there is an honest confrontation with it and a willing search for the truth and a
willingness to admit the truth when we discover it.”) (transcript available at
www.gphistorical.org/mlk/mlkspeech/index.htm); (“We shall overcome because Carlisle is right. ‘No
lie can live forever.’ We shall overcome because William Cullen Bryant is right. ‘Truth crushed to
earth will rise again.”). Id.
7
Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering U.S. Laws
that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 576 (2004).
8
Carola Eyber, Name-Calling Alienates Foreigners, 2 CROSSINGS (S. Afr. Migration Project,
Cape Town, South Africa), June 1998, available at http://www.queensu.ca/samp/forms/crform.html;
see also Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 265–70 (1996–97); see also Irwin
Colter, Op-Ed., The Holocaust Did Not Begin In the Gas Chambers – It Began With Words,
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atrocities including the Holocaust, Darfur, and the murder of Matthew
Shepard, are horrific examples of this intolerable truth. The term “illegals”
is patently dehumanizing and inappropriate terminology, and its persistent
use by extremists, as well as mainstream media and the general population,
must stop now.9
Second, as a low-income taxpayer and human rights advocate, I
understand that pervasive misunderstanding regarding undocumented
immigrants evinces the frustration and fear that many Americans feel about
the challenging state of the U.S. and global economies. Restrictionists feed
this frustration and fear with inflammatory propaganda about
undocumented immigrants and our tax systems. Because of overwhelming
complexity and lack of transparency in these systems, it is easy to
misrepresent and distort the facts, laws, and data. As a result, some
Americans believe the absolutely irrational and self-delusional assertion
that undocumented immigrants do not pay any taxes.10 This gross

JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/OpEdContributors/Article.aspx?id=130741 (reaffirming that the lessons of the Holocaust are a
commitment to never again be indifferent to racism, hate, injustice, or stand silently in the face of evil
or ignorant to the plight of the vulnerable).
9
On July 7, 2011, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, TIGTA issued a report
describing $4.2 billion of refundable tax child tax credits paid to “individuals who are not authorized to
work in the United States.” TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., RECOVERY ACT:
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO WORK IN THE UNITED STATES WERE PAID $4.2 BILLION
IN REFUNDABLE CREDITS 4 (2011), available at www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/
201141061fr.pdf. Shortly after the report was released, it went “viral” and the Internet was burning
with hateful comments about “illegals” pocketing or “stealing” billions of dollars of taxpayer money.
On September 8th, 2011 I searched “illegals $4.2 billion tax credits” and retrieved more than 30,000
hits, including main stream media (Fox News, ABC “The View”, Baltimore Sun, The Examiner, San
Diego Union, Drudge) using the terms “illegals,” “illegal aliens,” “illegal immigrants,” “illegal
workers,” etc. although the report never describes the taxpayers in this manner.
The child tax credit provides an annual tax subsidy of $52 billion for almost 35 million families
raising children and only 10 percent of the total expenditure goes to the lowest quintile (cash income of
$12,000 and below) of families while 25 percent (cash income of above $12,000 – $23,000), 27 percent
(cash income of above $23,000 – $39,000), 28 percent (cash income above $39,000 – $66,000) and 10
percent (cash incomes above $66,000) go to the next four income quintiles). Elaine Maag et al., A
Reference Manual for Child Tax Benefits, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR. (Apr. 2011),
www.taxpolicycenter.org/uploadedpdf/412329-child-tax-benefits.pdf. I find it interesting that the fact
that unauthorized workers pay more than three times that amount into Social Security and Medicare
taxes each year, or the fact that the highest quintile income Americans received $52 billion in tax
subsidy to raise their children, did not similarly go “viral.”
10
See John Lantigua, Illegal Immigrants Paying Taxes, PALM BEACH POST (Apr. 25, 2010),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/illegal-immigrants-paying-taxes-621300.html
(noting
that
frustrated and angry Americans commonly state that illegal aliens do not pay taxes despite paying
billions of dollars in Social Security taxes every year); see also O’Reilly, Dobbs Wrong That
Undocumented Immigrants Don’t Pay Taxes, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://mediamatters.org/research/201003100001 (Fox News’ The O’Reilly Factor host Bill O’Reilly
falsely asserted that the fact undocumented immigrants pay taxes is “crap” while his guest Lou Dobbs
suggested they dodge taxes); Quick Fact: Fox’s Bolling Falsely Claims That “Illegals” Are “Not
Paying Taxes”, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (May 2, 2010), http://mediamatters.org/research/
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falsehood is counterproductive for the speaker, the subject, and the U.S.
and global economies.
Finally, as a tax professor I am charged with teaching tax and these
comments broadcast loudly and boldly how misinformed Americans are
about our tax systems. The well-documented facts evidence that
undocumented immigrants have paid hundreds of billions of dollars in
taxes to date. In most cases undocumented immigrants pay more in tax
each year than similarly situated U.S. citizens. This additional tax, which
is exposed and labeled here as “the undocumented immigrant tax,” is the
subject of this Article.
This Article will describe the depth and breadth of undocumented
immigrants as a resource for tax payments made to government coffers
across America. The depth and breadth will be evinced by describing the
myriad of different federal, state, and local taxes undocumented
immigrants are subject to and pay. Most notably, this Article will verify
that undocumented immigrants not only pay the same taxes that U.S.
citizens and documented residents pay, but in addition that they are subject
to and pay what I am describing as “the undocumented immigrant tax.”
The undocumented immigrant tax is effectively an additional tax burden, a
surtax or tariff on undocumented immigrants and their families. As a
result, not only do undocumented immigrants pay taxes, but they bear a
greater tax burden than similarly situated U.S. citizens and documented
residents.
A. Across America Undocumented Immigrants are Paying Billions in
Taxes Each Year
The uncontroverted truth is that undocumented immigrants pay tens of
billions of dollars in taxes each year to federal, state and local
governments. These critical tax dollars are not paid to one government
coffer, but rather to federal, state, and local government pocketbooks
located across America. Undocumented immigrants reside in and pay
taxes daily to state and local governments from Portland, Maine to San
Diego, California and to countless state and local governments in the vast
expanse of America in between.
201005020006 (reporting and correcting the inaccurate statement made by Fox News host Eric Bolling
on May 1, 2010); see also Lydia Saad, Americans Closely Divided Over Immigration Reform Priority,
GALLUP (July 6, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141113/americans-closely-divided-immigrationreform-priority.aspx (finding that 78, 63 and 50 percent of Republicans, Independents and Democrats,
respectively, believe that undocumented immigrants cost taxpayers more than they contribute on the
tax rolls); see also Ruy Teixeira, What the Public Really Wants on Immigration, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS 2 (June 27, 2006), http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/teixeirajunepool-final.pdf. (70
percent of the polled public agreed with the statement that undocumented immigrants weaken the U.S.
economy because they do not all pay taxes, but use public services.).
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Since they first arrived in this country, undocumented immigrants have
paid and are expected to continue to pay hundreds of billions, perhaps
trillions, of dollars in federal, state, and local taxes. Indeed our tax and
social services systems, and American citizens, rely on undocumented
immigrants for revenue and fiscal support. The Inspector General of the
Social Security Administration has determined that undocumented
immigrants and their employers have paid between $120 and $240 billion
in Social Security taxes11 in addition to Medicare and unemployment taxes
on at least $1,107.5 billion of unauthorized inflation adjusted wages
(including $533.5 billion in the eight year period from 2000 through
2007).12 “Over the next 75 years, new immigrants will provide a net
benefit of approximately $611 billion in present value to the Social
Security system.”13 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
recently estimated that undocumented immigrants have paid $50 billion in
federal income taxes in the eight year period from 1996 through 2003.14
Therefore, undocumented immigrants have paid hundreds of billions to the
federal government just for federal income and wage taxes.
While these dollar amounts are significant, tax payments from
undocumented immigrants have been and are continuing to increase. In
the last decade, Social Security and Medicare taxes paid to the Social
Security Administration by undocumented immigrants have more than
tripled.15 In 2007, undocumented immigrants paid more than $12 billion in
Social Security and Medicare taxes.16 Holders of individual taxpayer
identification numbers (“ITIN”), the number used by individuals, including
undocumented immigrants and many foreign investors, who do not qualify
11
Edward Schumacher-Matos, How Illegal Immigrants Are Helping Social Security, WASH.
POST, Sept. 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/02/
AR2010090202673.html (“[B]y 2007, the Social Security trust fund had received a net benefit of
somewhere between $120 billion and $240 billion from unauthorized immigrants.”).
12
If adjusted for inflation the cumulative wages represented $835.3 billion would grow to
$1,107.5 billion by 2011. Mary Johnson, The Growing Cost of Illegal Immigration to Social Security:
Unprecedented Growth in Social Security’s “Earnings Suspense File”, THE SENIOR CITIZENS LEAGUE
3 (June 2010), http://www.seniorsleague.org/images/earnings_suspense_report.pdf.
13
Proposal to Strip Workers of Social Security Earnings Based on Prior Employment Status: Bad
for the System and an Affront to Our Values, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., (2007), http://www.nilc.org/
immlawpolicy/CIR/ensign_ss_amdmt_2007-02-28.pdf; see also THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC,
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 297–354 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmondston
eds., 1997) (noting that all immigrants in the United States pay on average $80,000 more in taxes per
capita than they receive during their lifetime).
14
Miriam Jordan, Even Workers in U.S. Illegally Pay Tax Man, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2007,
http://www.azeir.org/pdf/2007_0404_wsj_immagration-taxes.pdf.
15
Alan Zarembo, Garment Laborers Say Bush Guest-Worker Plan an Ill Fit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/08/local/me-immigrants8.
16
See Schumacher-Matos, supra note 11, (“[B]y 2007, the Social Security trust fund had
received a net benefit of somewhere between $120 billion and $240 billion from unauthorized
immigrants.”); At Tax Time, Illegal Immigrants Are Paying Too, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 10, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24054024/ns/business-personal_finance/t/tax-time-illegal-immigrantsare-paying-too/ (stating that the amount was $9 billion in 2005).
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for Social Security numbers (“SSN”), filed more than three million tax
returns in 2010.17 Moreover, in 2010 the Internal Revenue Service
received more than 1.6 million new ITIN applications.18 A 30 percent
increase in ITINs issued to undocumented immigrants from 2005 to 2006
arguably resulted in significant federal revenue growth.19
B. Many Types of Taxes Paid by Undocumented Immigrants
Undocumented immigrants pay taxes everyday across America for the
benefit of federal, state and local governments. In America taxes are
assessed on transactions, income, property, and on accumulated wealth.
Most Americans are very familiar with many of these transaction taxes
because they witness and engage in these transactions daily. When one
purchases goods, sales taxes often apply to the transaction and the
consumer pays the taxes assessed to the seller. These taxes are assessed by
state and local governments. Some goods and services, like alcohol,
cigarettes, gasoline, tires, and utilities are also subject to excise taxes,
which can be imposed by state, local and federal governments.
1.

Federal, State and Local Consumption Taxes

Undocumented immigrants, who live, work, eat and shop in America,
engage in consumption routinely. Not surprisingly, undocumented
immigrants are not exempt from consumption taxes. As a result,
undocumented immigrants, similar to American citizens and documented
residents, are subject to and pay sales, use, and excises taxes when they
purchase or use American goods and services. When an undocumented
immigrant purchases food, clothing, books, shoes, gasoline, alcohol, and
cigarettes she must pay any and all applicable federal, state and local sales,
use, and excise taxes. In addition, undocumented immigrants are subject to
and pay state and local property taxes.20 These transactions, whether made
by U.S. citizens, documented residents, or undocumented immigrants, are
subject to taxes and require payments that enhance the pocketbooks of
local, state, and federal governments.
There are more than ten million undocumented immigrants in this
17

TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 9, at 20 (setting forth filing statistics
on ITIN tax returns for 2005–2010).
18
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 319 (DEC. 31, 2010),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p2104.pdf.; see also Illegal Immigrants Filing Taxes More Than Ever,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18077009/ns/business-tax_tactics/
[hereinafter Illegal Immigrants Filing Taxes].
19
Illegal Immigrants Filing Taxes, supra note 18. In 2006, the IRS issued 1.5 million new ITINs,
the number used for federal income tax reporting by undocumented immigrants in lieu of a Social
Security number, a 30 percent increase over 2005.
20
See Randolph Capps & Michael E. Fix, Undocumented Immigrants: Myths and Reality, URBAN
INST. (2005), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900898_undocumented_immigrants.pdf.

2011]

THE “ILLEGAL” TAX

99

21

country comprising nearly seven million families with average family
earnings in 2007 of $36,000 ($50,000 for U.S. born families).22 Because
undocumented immigrants generally tend to have low levels of income and
receive little government support, they spend most, if not all, of their
income on goods that are often subject to consumption taxes.23
Undocumented immigrant families, therefore, pay a higher percentage of
their income in consumption taxes than U.S. citizens whose income tends
to be higher.24 As you have witnessed and can extrapolate from these
numbers, undocumented immigrants have paid and will continue to pay
billions of dollars in sales, use, excise, and property taxes as they consume
goods and services across America.
2. Federal, State, and Local Income Taxes
In addition to paying federal, state, and local consumption taxes,
undocumented immigrants, like American citizens and documented
residents, are subject to and pay federal and any applicable state and local
income taxes. The federal government has subjected non-U.S. citizens
residing in the United States (with or without documents) to income tax
since its enactment through the Revenue Act of 1913.25 Undocumented
21
MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009, 1 (2009), available at
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statitstics/pubications/ois_ill_pe_2009.pdf. The figure has decreased from
approximately 12 million in March 2006 to 11.1 million in March 2010. Compare CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, Preface to THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6Immigration.pdf., with Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population:
National and State Trends, 2010, PEW HISPANIC CTR. 1 (2011), http://pewhispanic.org/reports/
report.php?ReportID=133.pdf.
22
Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized immigrants in the United States,
PEW HISPANIC CTR. 16 (2009), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf.
23
Id. at iv–v (the 2007 median household income of unauthorized immigrants was $36,000, well
below the $50,000 median household income for U.S.-born residents. In contrast to other immigrants,
undocumented immigrants do not attain markedly higher incomes the longer they live in the United
States. A third of the children of unauthorized immigrants and a fifth of adult unauthorized immigrants
lives in poverty. This is nearly double the poverty rate for children of U.S.-born parents (18 percent) or
for U.S.-born adults (10 percent). More than half of adult unauthorized immigrants (59 percent) had no
health insurance during all of 2007. Among their children, nearly half of those who are unauthorized
immigrants (45 percent) were uninsured and 25 percent of those who were born in the U.S. were
uninsured); DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., INFORMATION ON POVERTY AND INCOME
STATISTICS: A SUMMARY OF 2011 CURRENT POPULATION DATA 5 (2011), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/11/ib.pdf (developed more than 40 years ago, the official poverty measure
is a specific dollar amount that varies by family size but is the same across the continental U.S.
According to the 2011 federal poverty guidelines, the poverty level is $22,314 for a family of four); see
NANCY K. CAUTHEN & SARAH FASS, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, MEASURING POVERTY
IN THE UNITED STATES (2008), available at http://www.nccp.org/publications/pub_825.html
(describing the poverty threshold as the basic amount needed to make ends meet, that is, that at the
poverty level of income all income must be spent on basic goods and services necessary for survival).
24
The Numbers, TAX POLICY CENTER. URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR. (NOV. 10, 2009),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/displayatab.cfm?DocID=2478.
25
Thomas St.G. Bissell, 907-3rd Tax Management, U.S. Income Taxation of Nonresident Alien
Individuals A1, A3 (2010).
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immigrants are also subject to applicable state and local income taxes
similar to U.S. citizens and documented immigrants if they reside in or
earn income in a jurisdiction with such taxes.26
While undocumented immigrants are subject to the same consumption
and property tax rates as U.S. citizens and documented immigrants, this
Article will also demonstrate that undocumented immigrants are subject to
federal income taxes at a higher effective tax rate than similarly situated
citizens and documented residents. Despite the shibboleth that
undocumented immigrants are not subject to and do not pay income taxes,
the truth is that they are and often at a higher effective tax rate than
similarly situated U.S. citizens and documented immigrants.
Congress uses its plenary power to tax under the Constitution to write
tax laws.27 The higher effective tax rate suffered by undocumented
immigrants is a direct result of tax laws written by members of Congress.
This additional tax burden is a surtax or tariff borne by these taxpayers
because of their immigration status.28
Undocumented immigrants are subject to income taxes at a higher
effective tax rate for a number of reasons. For example, undocumented
immigrants (and their American citizen or documented spouses and
children) do not qualify for the refundable earned income tax credit
(“EITC”). This bipartisan supported annual credit, which for 2011 will be
as great as $5,751, is targeted to working poor families.29 Even though
most undocumented immigrant families are in this targeted group, they are
statutorily denied this tax credit because of their immigration status.30
Members of Congress deny this credit to working poor families who do not
qualify for a SSN because they do not want to encourage unauthorized

26
STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING RESIDENT STATUS 2009
2–4 (2009) (a resident subject to California income tax is any individual who is present in California for
other than a temporary or transitory period of time or who is domiciled in California, but temporarily or
transitorily away). State income taxes, like federal income taxes, are imposed generally on individuals
who are physically present in the region for a long enough period of time to be deemed “residents”
under state law. Id. For example, in California, where approximately 2.6 million undocumented
immigrants reside, or 25 percent of all undocumented immigrants in the United States. See Teresa
Watanabe, Illegal Immigrant Numbers Plunge, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/feb/11/local/la-me-immig11-2010feb11.
27
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
28
See MAURICE SCHIFF, THE WORLD BANK DEV. RESEARCH GRP., LOVE THY NEIGHBOR:
TRADE, MIGRATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 19–22 (2000), available at http://www.netamericas.net/
researchpapers/documents/schifh/schiff2.pdf (discussion of optimal immigration theory presenting a
model that incorporates an immigration tax).
29
See Preview of 2011 EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit Amounts and Tax Law Updates,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (last updated Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/individuals/
article/0,,id=233839,00.html; I.R.S. Publ’n 596, Earned Income Credit (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gove/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf (this 2010 figure is the maximum allowed for “three or more
qualifying children”).
30
I.R.C § 32(c) (2006).
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31

work.
Another reason undocumented immigrants were subject to a higher
income tax rate in 2008 was that undocumented immigrants (who were not
married to members of the military) did not qualify for the 2008 economic
stimulus tax credit. This refundable tax credit was up to $600 per
qualifying individual and $300 per qualifying child. The tax credit was
designed for low- and middle-income working families, most senior
citizens, and certain veterans because they would be likely to spend the tax
refund and stimulate the stalling U.S. economy. While the tax credit was
basically a temporary tax rate cut, undocumented immigrants were
specifically excluded as a result of Congressional response to last minute
anti-immigrant outcries.32
In addition to these two statutory exclusions, undocumented
immigrants may be subject to a higher effective income tax rate because of
more challenging reporting requirements. Many undocumented
immigrants, like many U.S. citizens, pay their federal and state income
taxes through wage withholding. Therefore, to receive a refund of any
overpayment of their federal and state income taxes they are required to
file tax returns requesting refunds. However, undocumented immigrants
must file their tax returns with an ITIN because they do not qualify for a
SSN. Because of the misperception of abuse of this number, obtaining an
ITIN is not a simple task. Whereas a SSN is issued to all U.S. citizens
immediately at birth, an ITIN must be obtained through an onerous
application process requiring original identification documents, which
might not be readily accessible.33 In addition, because of lack of access to
and intimidation by federal state and local income tax systems and
government officials, millions of undocumented immigrants do not file tax
returns. Therefore, these taxpayers have very likely overpaid their federal
and state tax liabilities.34
While the government can assess a tax deficiency (together with
interest and penalties) at any time if a taxpayer has not filed her return,35
tax refund claims generally must be filed within three years from the date
31
See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL
YEAR 2005 REVENUE PROPOSAL 88 (2004), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/bluebk04.pdf. Congressional intent is evinced in its enactment of the requirement
for a SSN specifically valid for work. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 451, 110 Stat. 2105, 2276 (1996) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 32(c)).
32
Martin Kady II, Lou Dobbs Alert: Illegal Immigrants May Get Rebates, POLITICO (Jan. 30,
2008, 12:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/thecrypt/0108/
Lou_Dobbs_alert_Illegal_immigrants_may_get_rebates.html#.
33
Francine J. Lipman, Bearing Witness to Economic Injustices of Undocumented Immigrant
Families: A New Class of “Undeserving” Poor, 7 Nev. L.J. 736, 747 (Summer 2007).
34
See I.R.S. Publ’n 1304, 6 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09inalcr.pdf
(setting forth the number of individual income tax returns that were overpaid).
35
I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) (2006).
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36

of the filing deadline. The government will deny tax refund claims made
after the statute of limitations has expired.37 Therefore, undocumented
immigrant families who suffer numerous barriers to filing too often find
themselves filing late and losing precious tax refunds.38 If a past tax
liability is owed, it will accrue interest and applicable penalties from the
due date of the return. Time barred refunds cannot offset any tax, penalties
and interest owed.39 As a result of their lack of access to tax resources,
undocumented immigrant families are more likely to lose tax refunds and
be subject to interest and penalties on any tax deficiencies.
While the statutes of limitation bar any taxpayer refund claims after
three years and do not bar the government’s assessment of tax deficiencies
at any time if a taxpayer fails to file her tax return, these rules apply to U.S.
citizens as well as documented and undocumented immigrants. However,
proposed immigration reform in 2006 would have denied undocumented
immigrants from receiving any tax benefit from any overpayment of back
taxes.40 These tax overpayments could not even have been applied to any
underpayment of back taxes. Moreover, the proposal would have denied
undocumented immigrants from any tax benefit from any otherwise
available tax credits.41 The denial of any tax credit or refund is
unprecedented and irrational. This proposal if enacted would have
dramatically raised the effective income tax rate for undocumented
immigrants. These existing and proposed tax laws increase the effective
tax rate for undocumented immigrants as compared to similarly situated
U.S. citizens or documented immigrants. Therefore, not only are
undocumented immigrant families subject to and paying federal and state
income taxes, but many are paying income taxes at a notably higher
effective tax rate.
3. Employment and Self-Employment Taxes
In addition to paying consumption and income taxes, unauthorized
workers and their employers are subject to and pay Social Security and
Medicare taxes and other federal and state employment taxes (e.g.,
unemployment, disability, etc.) on their wages and self-employment
income. Unauthorized workers and their employers must each pay Social
Security and Medicare taxes of 7.65 percent on all wages (Social Security
tax is subject to a wage cap, but the cap of $106,800 in 2011 well exceeds
36

I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2006).
I.R.C. § 6511(b)(1) (2006).
38
See infra Parts II,E.2.-5.
39
I.R.C. § 6511(h)(1) (2006) (stating that if the taxpayer can prove that they were financially
disabled then during such period the statute of limitations would lapse); Rev. Proc. 99-21 (1999),
available at http://www.unclefed.com/Tax-Bulls/1999/rp99-21.pdf.
40
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 245B(a)(1)(E)(i)
(2006).
41
Id.
37
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the average wages for unauthorized workers) for an aggregate tax rate of
15.3 percent.42 Most economists believe that the burden of payroll taxes
paid by employers is born by employees.43 All workers who are selfemployed must pay the employer’s and the employee’s Social Security and
Medicare taxes for an aggregate tax rate of 15.3 percent. Therefore,
unauthorized workers, like all workers residing and working in the U.S.,
are subject to a 15.3 percent effective wage tax rate.
The Social Security Administration noted several years ago that
approximately 75 percent of unauthorized workers and their employers pay
Social Security and Medicare taxes.44 Given the recent government focus
on employer compliance with immigration laws, the current payroll tax
compliance percentage most likely is greater than 75 percent. Therefore,
most unauthorized workers are subject to and pay through automatic
withholding a wage tax totaling approximately $12 billion in 2007.45
Wage taxes, like Social Security and Medicare taxes, are regressive as
compared to income taxes which are generally progressive. Progressive
tax rates generally increase with the level of income because the marginal
value of a dollar at the higher level of income is less valuable than a dollar
of poverty level income. Because Social Security taxes are imposed on
wages and not interest, dividends, or capital gains, they are capped at a
threshold wage base ($106,800 in 2011; Medicare tax is uncapped for 2.9
percent of the aggregate tax of 15.3 percent),46 wage taxes represent a
greater percentage of income for lower income earners than higher income
earners. As a result, the effective Social Security and Medicare tax rate for
many undocumented immigrant families whose income is comprised only
of wages is 15.3 percent. However, for a high-income family with wages
above the threshold and interest, dividend and capital gain income, their
effective Social Security and Medicare tax rate would be significantly
lower.
While Social Security and Medicare taxes are regressive, Social
42
In 2011 Congress reduced the Social Security rate temporarily (for one year) for employees by
2 percent. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296, 3309 (2010).
43
JOHN A. BRITTAIN, BROOKINGS INST., THE PAYROLL TAX FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 13
(Brookings Inst. eds., 1972); JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 67–68 (Urban
Inst. Press eds., 2006).
44
152 Cong. Rec. S4742 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cornyn quoting Steven
Gross, Social Security’s chief actuary); HENRY LOPEZ ET AL., CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION
STUDIES, IMPACTS OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT ON MEXICAN MIGRATION: THE VIEW FROM SENDING
COMMUNITIES 89 (Wayne A. Cornelius & Jessica M. Lewis eds., 2007).
45
See Schumacher-Matos, supra note 11 (“by 2007, the Social Security trust fund had received a
net benefit of somewhere between $120 billion and $240 billion from unauthorized immigrants”); At
Tax Time, Illegal Immigrants Are Paying Too, supra note 16 (stating that the amount was $9 billion in
2005).
46
See Contribution and Benefit Base, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/
cbb.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
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Security and Medicare benefits are notably progressive. The Social
Security system is designed to provide a safety net for retirement for low
and middle-income workers and their families. To provide this safety net,
the Social Security benefit formula redistributes financial resources from
higher wage earners to lower wage earners. As a result, the Social Security
benefit formula provides a higher return on wage tax contributions to lower
wage earners than higher wage earners.48 Moreover, every Social Security
benefit qualifying recipient irrespective of their wage level receives health
care insurance coverage through Medicare. Arguably, this health care
coverage is more valuable to lower income retirees than higher income
retirees who have or could pay for alternative coverage. Therefore, while
Social Security and Medicare taxes are notably regressive resulting in
higher effective tax rates for lower individuals than higher income
individuals, the Social Security and Medicare benefits package
corresponding to the tax payments is progressive.
However, unauthorized workers, who have paid between $120 and
$240 billion in Social Security taxes through 2007 and who currently pay
and are projected to pay even more in the future, will never qualify for
these critical benefits unless they obtain work authorization and are legally
present in the United States.49 While U.S. citizens and authorized workers
are subject to the same regressive taxes, they qualify for the priceless
progressive benefits of a secure and inflation-adjusted retirement income
and a lifetime of health insurance coverage starting at age 65.
Undocumented immigrants who pay these taxes at the same regressive tax
rate, however, do not receive any Social Security benefits or Medicare
health benefits.50 Therefore, undocumented immigrants effectively are
47

See Francine J. Lipman & James E. Williamson, Social Security Benefits Formula 101 ORANGE
COUNTY LAWYER, May 2011 at 10; See Cong. Budget Office, Is Social Security Progressive?
ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF, Dec. 2006 at 1; NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, The SOCIAL
SECURITY PROGRAM AND REFORM: A LATINO PERSPECTIVE 3 (2005).
48
NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, supra note 47, at 3.
49
See FRANCINE LIPMAN, FRANCINE LIPMAN ON SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND
IMMIGRANTS 3 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. eds., 2007) (discussing the restrictions workers both
eligible and ineligible face when attempting to receive monthly benefits).
50
President Bush signed the Social Security Protection Act of 2004 into law in March 2004.
Under the Act a noncitizen who files for Social Security retirement benefits based on an SSN assigned
on or after January 1, 2004, is required to have work authorization at the time the SSN is assigned or at
some later time to attain insured status. Only if the individual receives work authorization may she
apply for Social Security benefits. If a retiree obtains work authorization, her filing will be based on all
Social Security-covered earnings regardless of work status during the earnings period. But if an
individual never receives authorization to work, none of her Social Security-covered earnings count
toward eligibility for any benefits. A noncitizen who applies for Social Security retirement benefits
based upon an SSN assigned before January 1, 2004, is not subject to the work-authorization
requirement. All of the noncitizens Social Security-covered earnings count toward eligibility regardless
of her work-authorization status. However, as indicated above, no monthly benefit can be paid for any
month during which the retiree is not lawfully present in the United States or has been residing outside
of the United States for more than six consecutive months.
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subject to a significantly higher payroll tax burden than similarly situated
U.S. citizens and authorized workers.
C. Undocumented Immigrants are a Fiscal Windfall to Americans from
Sea to Shining Sea
There is no doubt that undocumented immigrants have paid, are paying
and will continue to pay billions of dollars in federal, state, and local
income, sales, use, property, payroll, and excise taxes every year.51
Because of increased compliance efforts by the government and an
increasing number of immigrants, the magnitude of these payments has
been increasing dramatically over the recent decades.
While
undocumented immigrants undeniably contribute billions of dollars to
government coffers annually, they do not qualify for almost any federal
public assistance programs.52 Generally, the only benefits federally
required for undocumented immigrants are emergency medical care–
which is subject to financial and category eligibility–and primary and
secondary public education for children.53 Even these minimal benefits are
offset to some extent because most undocumented immigrants are adults
who come to America to work and have already received their own
primary and secondary education paid for by their home country.
Therefore, even the costs of primary and secondary education, as required
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe54, is arguably offset to
some extent by the windfall of undocumented children’s parents’ educated
status.
Some economists believe that immigrants are not the problem, but

Even if the foregoing hurdles are jumped, a retiree has the burden of proving her earnings
history, and only wages that are reported to the SSA, not paid under the table, count toward the
required forty quarters of earnings to qualify for Social Security benefits. Because unauthorized
workers usually do not have an SSN, the SSA will not have an accurate record of their earnings history.
Accordingly, retirees with unauthorized work must provide satisfactory documentation to the SSA of
their annual earnings history. Currently, the SSA has a policy of assisting, and not prosecuting, these
workers, because the SSA is charged with maintaining correct earnings records. However, this policy
can be changed at any time. It is a felony to falsely use an SSN, carrying a penalty of up to $5,000 and
five years in prison.
Id. at 3.
51
Michele Waslin, Assessing the Economic Impact of Immigration at the State and Local Level,
IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR., (2008), http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/publishedarticles2008/
IPC_StateStudiesImmigration2007.pdf.
52
See Tanya Broder, Immigrant Eligibility for Public Benefits, in IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK (Gregory P. Adam, et al. eds., 2005).
53
See generally Elizabeth R. Chesler, Denying Undocumented Immigrants Access to Medicaid: A
Denial of Their Equal Protection Rights?, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255 (2008). Undocumented
immigrants do not qualify for Social Security benefits, Medicare, Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families, federal housing programs, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income,
unemployment insurance, the EITC and most recently the Economic Stimulus Tax Credit.
54
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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rather are the solution to many domestic economic problems.
Julian
Simon, renowned economist, has noted that “every study that provides
dollar estimates shows that when the sum of the tax contributions to city,
state and federal government are allowed for, those tax payments vastly
exceed the cost of the services used, by a factor of perhaps five, ten or
more.”56 The denial of nearly all federal, state, and local benefits, with the
imposition of all federal, state, and local taxes as well as additional tax
burdens specifically imposed on undocumented immigrants because of
their status makes undocumented immigrants a fiscal windfall.57
D. No Simple Answers
“The trouble about man is twofold. He cannot learn truths which are
too complicated; he forgets truths which are too simple.”58
Despite decades of observable evidence to the contrary, 70 percent of
Americans agreed with the statement that undocumented immigrants
weaken our economy because they don’t all pay taxes, but use public
services.59 As a result of persistent propaganda casting “illegal aliens” as
the scapegoat for all of the nation’s problems, most Americans believe they
are bearing the burden of undocumented immigrants rather than enjoying
the benefits of a low-cost, taxpaying labor force.
Because of increasing complexity and lack of transparency in our tax,
immigration and other government systems, the public is increasingly more
vulnerable to the persistent litany of misinformation by restrictionists.60 In
challenging times simple “sound-bite” answers are more palatable than
truthfully complex multi-faceted responses. As our world becomes more
and more complicated we must work harder and harder to understand these
intricate interdisciplinary issues and educate ourselves and others. We
must resist the temptation to accept the easy, but irrational answer. I fear
we are losing this battle. Most Americans, many of whom are descendants
of immigrants, believe illogically and against their own best interest that
immigrants are the adversary and not the ally.

55

See DOWELL MYERS, IMMIGRANTS AND BOOMERS: FORGING A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR
(2007).
56
JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 295 (1989).
57
Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Law Into the Breach Once
More, 21 N.M. L. REV. 219, 244–46 (1991).
58
Rebecca West Quotation, BRAINYQUOTE.COM, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/r/
rebeccawes108172.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
59
TEIXEIRA, supra note 10.
60
See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR, UNDER SIEGE, LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE
SOUTH, supra note 3 (noting that the toxic immigration debate has “transformed the perception of
Latino immigrants from that of valuable workers eager to help transform the city into a major financial
center to a destructive force that has infiltrated the city”).
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 6–7
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Exposure and Education Are the First Step

Alarmist propaganda must be countered with persistent education and
dissemination of accurate and accessible information. In this Article, I
plan to expose and explain the “undocumented immigrant tax.” As
described, undocumented immigrants are subject to and pay taxes just like
U.S. citizens and documented immigrants. However, undocumented
immigrants are subject to and pay a greater amount of taxes because
Congress has imposed financial penalties on certain U.S. residents because
they do not have documents that support their current residency status.
Section II of this Article will describe the composition of “the
undocumented immigrant income tax.” The additional income taxes as
described briefly above include the denial of the EITC, a bipartisan
supported refundable tax credit that rewards work for low-income families,
and the denial of the 2008 economic stimulus tax credit for all
undocumented immigrants (unless they are a current member of the armed
forces or married to one). Another additional income tax was proposed by
former Senator John Ensign of Nevada as part of comprehensive
immigration reform. His proposal was to retroactively deny all otherwise
available tax credits including tax overpayments to any undocumented
immigrant requesting documents.61 While this additional income tax is the
most significant and onerous it has fortunately not yet been passed into
law. However, there is little doubt that this or similar concepts will be
reintroduced when immigration reform is addressed in the future.
The final issue resulting in additional income tax burden for
undocumented immigrants is procedural, but the procedure is required by
statute. Undocumented immigrant families are overpaying their federal
and state income tax liabilities because they have limited access to the
requisite information needed for filing their tax returns. In addition,
because of fear of deportation, undocumented immigrants are intimidated
by government agencies and limit their interactions with them, especially
when the interaction requires disclosure that makes them even more
vulnerable.62 As a result, millions of undocumented immigrants do not
prepare and file tax returns, thereby significantly overpaying their federal
and state income taxes. Moreover, once they do get access to the resources
necessary to file their tax returns their tax refunds may be barred by the
statute of limitations, but any outstanding tax liabilities will be assessed
together with interest and penalties; thereby, increasing their effective tax
burden because of limited access to financial justice.
Section III of this Article will discuss the enormously regressive
burden of employment, including self-employment, taxes on
61

Proposal to Strip Workers of Social Security Earnings Based on Prior Immigration Status,
NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.nilc.org/ss-workers.html.
62
See infra Part II.E.
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undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants have paid between
$120 and $240 billion in Social Security, Medicare, unemployment, and
disability wage taxes to federal and state governments to date, yet they do
not qualify for any benefits under any of these critical safety net systems.
This section will describe the current state of this regressive burden as well
as recent proposals by former Senator John Ensign to increase this already
onerous encumbrance for undocumented immigrants. Section IV of this
Article will summarize these economic injustices so that one can better
understand these issues and respond rationally and thoughtfully to those
that misunderstand them, and so that one can make informed decisions
regarding forthcoming immigration, tax, and social justice reform for all.
As Dr. King wrote so passionately to his fellow clergymen from the
confines of the Birmingham City Jail:
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We
are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a
single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly
affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live
with the narrow, provincial ‘outside agitator’ idea. Anyone
who lives in the United States can never be considered an
outsider anywhere in this country.63
II. THE “ILLEGAL” TAX
A.

A Constructive and Instructive Tax Analysis

Immigration, tax, and financial justice reform will demand
constructive debates of the facts and issues. Debate demands words and
instructive, rather than destructive, terminology. Because human history
evinces that hateful words lead to hateful acts, this Article will use terms
that are informative and further, rather than undermine, the discussion.64 It
will use the term “undocumented immigrants” to refer to “people who
presently possess no proof of any right to be present in the Unites States,
whether or not they have been declared deportable by the U.S. government
(and the vast majority have not).”65 This Article will use the term
“unauthorized workers” to describe people who are forbidden under
immigration laws to work for pay, which does not necessarily mean they
are residing in the United States without documents. For purposes of this
63

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM CITY JAIL, IN A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 290 (James M. Washington ed.,
1986).
64
MILTON MELTZER, NEVER TO FORGET: THE JEWS OF THE HOLOCAUST 45 (1976); MICHAEL
BERENBAUM, THE WORLD MUST KNOW: THE HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST AS TOLD IN THE UNITED
STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM 18–25 (1993).
65
Lyon, supra note 7, at 581.
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Article a family residing in the United States long enough to be subject to
U.S. federal income taxes and in which not every member has a valid SSN
will be described as an “undocumented immigrant family.”
B. The Denial of the EITC
Similar to U.S. citizens, undocumented immigrant families are subject
to federal, state, and local income taxes. However, consistent with U.S.
financial justice policy the federal income tax system, and many state
income tax systems, are designed to encourage work by providing that
poverty level working families receive antipoverty relief, which offsets
their income and other tax burdens, through tax credits.66 Undocumented
immigrant families are excluded statutorily from the most significant
component of this antipoverty relief. As a result, undocumented immigrant
families bear a greater income tax burden than similarly situated U.S.
citizens and documented residents.
1. Antipoverty Relief for Certain Working Poor Families under the
EITC
In 1972, then-Governor Ronald Reagan, testifying before Congress
regarding a workfare approach to government assistance, “suggested that
the federal government should exempt low income families from income
taxes and give them a rebate for their Social Security taxes.” 67 Several
years later, Senator Russell Long, the conservative Democrat chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, and Congressman Al Ullman, the moderate
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, packaged the idea in
a refundable tax credit and won liberal support for the EITC. Since it was
developed and established in 1975 by conservative forces, the EITC has
enjoyed bipartisan support for encouraging work.68
The EITC, completely administered through the tax system, is the
largest cash assistance and most successful antipoverty program in
America for working poor families reaching more individuals than more
traditional financial justice programs.69 “Research strongly confirms that
the EITC has played a critical role in bringing more single mothers into the
66

William Safire, The 25% Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/
1995/04/20/opinion/essay-the-25-solution.html.
67
SAUL D. HOFFMAN & LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, W.E. UPJOHN INST. FOR EMP’T RESEARCH,
HELPING WORKING FAMILIES: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 12 (2003).
68
Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J.
755, 801 (2005).
69
See ELAINE MAAG & ADAM CARASSO, TAX POLICY CTR., TAXATION AND THE FAMILY: WHAT
IS THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT? (2010), available at http://taxpolicycenter.org/briefingbook/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm; see LEONARD E. BURMAN & DEBORAH I. KOBES, TAX POLICY
CTR., TAX NOTES: EITC REACHES MORE ELIGIBLE FAMILIES THAN TANF, FOOD STAMPS, (2003),
available at http://www.urban.org/publications/1000467.html.
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workforce.” The EITC lifts millions of families out of poverty, including
millions of children, each year.71 Without the EITC, the number of
children living in poverty would increase by one-third.72
The EITC is a refundable tax credit that provides cash payments of up
to $5,751 (for 2011) to ensure that working poor families pay little or no
income or payroll taxes.73 While initially designed to offset the burdens of
income and payroll taxes, the EITC in some cases provides a meaningful
wage subsidy for low-income working families.74 The EITC provides
critical cash refunds for basic necessities like housing, utilities, food, and
basic household appliances.75 In 2010, approximately 20.1 million
households with children received an average EITC credit of $2,661, an
excess of $53 billion.76
a. Qualifying for the EITC
The EITC was designed by Congress to encourage low-income
families to work. Accordingly, to qualify for the EITC an individual and
her spouse, if married, must have earned income within certain lowerearned income ranges. The EITC and the earned income ranges are
indexed for inflation annually and vary meaningfully with the number of
qualifying children. For eligible individuals with three or more qualifying
children, the maximum 2011 EITC is $5,751 for income levels of less than
$43,998 ($49,078 for “married filing jointly”).77 Because the EITC is
targeted for families, the maximum EITC benefits decrease for eligible
individuals with two qualifying children ($5,112), one qualifying child
($3,094) and most significantly for taxpayers with no qualifying children
($464).78 Married taxpayers, with or without children, who file their tax
return separately will not receive any EITC although they may have
70
STEVE HOLT, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE 30: WHAT WE KNOW, BROOKINGS
INST., 1, 14 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/
2006/02childrenfamilies_holt/20060209_Holt.pdf.
71
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
(2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2505 (stating that roughly 6
million people, including 3 million children, were lifted out of poverty by the EITC in 2009); MAAG ET
AL., supra note 69 (stating that roughly 4 million people were lifted out of poverty by the EITC in
2006); ALAN BERUBE, THE NEW SAFETY NET: HOW THE TAX CODE HELPED LOW-INCOME WORKING
FAMILIES DURING THE EARLY 2000S, BROOKINGS INST., 2—3 (2006), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2006/02childrenfamilies_berube/20060209_newsaf
ety.pdf.
72
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 71.
73
Rev. Proc. 2011-2, 2011-2 I.R.B. 299.
74
See Robert Greenstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Boosting Employment, Aiding the
Working Poor, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/
archiveSite/7-19-05eic.pdf.
75
DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 13 (2004).
76
MAAG et al., supra note 9; see CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES supra note 71.
77
Rev. Proc. 2011-2, supra note 73.
78
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79

otherwise qualified for thousands of dollars. The EITC is not intended to
benefit low wage earners with above average investments so eligible
individuals cannot have investment income in excess of $3,150 per year.80
b. Congress Tries to Limit EITC Relief for Authorized Work
Only
In 1996, Congress enacted and President Clinton signed into law the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,81 which
included unprecedented restrictions on federal benefits for many
immigrants. Among the long list of benefit restrictions, Congress decided
that “individuals who are not authorized to work in the United States”
should be denied EITC benefits.82 To accomplish this goal, Congress
amended the Internal Revenue Code to require that any taxpayer (and, if
married, her spouse) and each qualified child must provide a valid SSN
(issued to individuals authorized to work in the United States) to receive
EITC benefits.83
SSNs have been issued to workers since the implementation of the
1935 Social Security Act. The SSN numbering system was designed to
provide a method for employers to report and the U.S. government to track
Social Security earnings for purposes of payroll tax and retirement benefit
calculations. In the 1960s computerization caused the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) and private businesses to rely on SSNs as a method of
accumulating, sorting, and tracking information relating to individuals.
For sixty years, the federal government issued SSNs to workers
irrespective of their immigration status. As a result, there are numerous
undocumented immigrants and unauthorized workers with valid SSNs that
were issued to them by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”).
Through the early 1980s the government only kept internal records
regarding an unauthorized worker’s immigration status. Beginning in 1982
Social Security cards issued to unauthorized workers were marked “Not
Valid for Employment” and temporarily authorized workers received cards
marked “Valid Only with INS Authorization.”84

79
See I.R.S. Pub. 501, Filing Status, Married Filing Separately, Special Rules,
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p501/ar02.html#en_US_2011_publink1000220762 (last visited Dec.
27, 2011).
80
I.R.C. § 32(2)(i)(1) (2006) (describing the disqualifying investment income as interest,
dividends, net capital gains, net rents, net royalties and net passive income).
81
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93,
110 Stat. 2105.
82
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 394 (Comm. Print 1996).
83
I.R.C. § 32(c) (2006).
84
Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and
Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 21 (2006).
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In an effort to stop unauthorized workers from being hired, Congress
enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. This Act,
among other things, required employers to have all new employees prove
their identity and work authorization with specific documents.85 Congress
listed a Social Security card as an acceptable document evidencing proof
of work authorization.86 As a result of this requirement, there has been
widespread use of counterfeit Social Security cards among unauthorized
workers making it “more common and easier than ever for [unauthorized]
workers to enter and function in the U.S. labor market.”87
As late as 1996, the SSA began limiting its issuance of SSNs to
individuals who were U.S. citizens and immigrants authorized for
employment in the United States. This limitation caused a problem for
individuals who needed a taxpayer identification number for filing tax
returns (for example, foreign investors). In response to this need, the IRS
introduced a new taxpayer identification number for use by individuals
who are not citizens or nationals of the United States and are not eligible
for SSNs.88 After December 31, 1996, individuals who do not qualify for a
SSN, but have a tax filing requirement must apply for and use their ITIN
on all their tax filings.89 The ITIN, like a SSN, is a unique nine-digit
number. The number is intended to be used for tax purposes only and does
not affect immigration status, authorize work in the United States, or
provide eligibility for Social Security benefits. Undocumented immigrants
are not authorized to work in the United States and, therefore, are not
eligible for a SSN. Unauthorized workers and undocumented immigrants
must obtain an ITIN to file any required tax returns or to be listed as a
dependent or spouse on any tax return.
c. Congress’ Denial of EITC Benefits for Unauthorized
Work is Designed Poorly and Overbroad in its Application
The enactment of immigration reform in 1996 was intended to deny
most federal benefits to undocumented immigrants including federal
benefits for unauthorized work. The EITC, deemed a federal tax benefit,
was amended to provide that every individual listed on a tax return had to
have a valid SSN to qualify for any EITC relief.90
This requirement is poorly designed as it denies EITC benefits to
legally present and legally working immigrant families. Consistent with
Congress’ intent, the SSN requirement will in most cases deny EITC
85

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §101(b)(1) (1986).
Id. at §101(b)(C)(1).
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Paula N. Singer & Linda Dodd-Major, Identification Numbers and U.S. Government
Compliance Initiatives, 104 TAX NOTES 1429, 1431 (2004).
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Lipman, supra note 84, at 21.
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benefits for unauthorized work; but, because it requires an SSN for both
working and nonworking spouses if a taxpayer is married, it is overbroad.
For example, the SSN requirement denies EITC benefits to U.S. citizens or
authorized workers whose nonworking spouses have valid ITINs, but no
SSN. The spouse could be legally present in the United States or a resident
of another country. Even if the couple has one or more qualifying children
who are U.S. citizens with SSNs, this legally present and working family
will not qualify for any EITC benefits.91
If the family decides to file a married filing separate return so that all
individuals on the tax return have SSNs, they will not qualify for any
EITC. Married taxpayers cannot qualify for the EITC with a married filing
separate tax return.92 Only if the couple ends their marriage or never enters
into marriage, will crucial EITC benefits be available.93 As a result,
undocumented immigrants are faced with an effective federal income tax
rate that is higher than the tax rate for a U.S. citizen family with the same
characteristics.
C. The Denial of the 2008 Economic Stimulus Tax Credit
1. How the 2008 Economic Stimulus Tax Credit Works
The denial of EITC benefits meaningfully increases the effective
income tax rate for undocumented immigrants and their families. In 2008
this relatively higher effective tax rate was even more pronounced due to
the denial of the economic stimulus tax credit for undocumented
immigrants. The 2008 economic stimulus tax credit was part of a $170
billion bipartisan package passed by Congress in February 2008 with the
intention of stimulating the stalling U.S. economy.94 The $600 per taxpayer
one time tax credit was targeted to low and middle-income taxpayers. After
weeks of debate the Democrats convinced the Republicans to extend the
credit to certain non-taxpayers including the working poor, senior citizens
collecting Social Security benefits, and disabled veterans collecting
Veteran Administration benefits. However, anti-immigrant politicians and
groups, including Federation for American Immigration Reform, former
Congressman Tom Tancredo, and former Senator John Ensign convinced
Congress to deny the credit to all undocumented immigrants and their
families. 95
91
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The basic concept of the economic stimulus was a tax rate reduction in
the lowest tax bracket thereby benefiting all taxpayers.96 To achieve this
goal, Congress effectively reduced the 10 percent income tax rate to zero
for up to $6,000 of taxable income for every taxpayer.97 To achieve this
rate reduction the stimulus was designed as a tax credit, a dollar for dollar
tax reduction up to 10 percent of taxable income, or $600, ($6,000 x 10%)
per taxpayer.98 In addition to the basic tax credit, the package provided an
additional tax credit of $300 per qualifying child. The tax credit was
designed for low- and middle-income taxpayers, and it phased out for
higher income taxpayers ($75,000 or more of adjusted gross income or
$150,000 or more, if married filing jointly) by 5 percent for any amount
above these thresholds.99
The economic stimulus package was targeted to low- and middleincome families because their economic circumstances would cause them
to use these tax refunds promptly to purchase goods and services to
stimulate the failing U.S. economy.100 Congress designed the credit to be
partially refundable to get the credit into the hands of needy senior citizens
and the working poor who had insufficient income to generate any taxable
income. Any individual with at least $3,000 of any combination of earned
income, Social Security benefits, and certain veterans’ benefits qualified
for a 10 percent, or $300, refundable tax credit.101
Congress desperately wanted the tax credit to stimulate the economy as
quickly as possible. To expedite the distribution of the 2008 tax credit, the
credit was payable as soon as practicable in 2008 based upon filed 2007
tax returns.102 Those individuals who did not receive the full tax credit
based upon their filed 2007 tax returns qualified for any remaining tax
credit when they filed their 2008 tax return in 2009.103 However, Congress
voted to deny this tax rate reduction for undocumented immigrant working
families based solely upon their immigration status.104 Like the EITC, a
legally working and present family could be denied the 2008 tax rate cut.

Illegal Aliens (Mar. 2008), www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/March08_NL.pdf?docID=5905.
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See I.R.C. § 6428 (2006).
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2. How the 2008 Economic Stimulus Tax Credit Does Not Work
To preclude undocumented immigrants from receiving the tax credit,
Congress required that only individuals with a SSN would be eligible for
the credit.105 Similar to the EITC, married couples filing jointly had to
provide a SSN for each spouse to qualify for any amount of credit. In
addition, qualifying children had to have SSNs. ITINs were not acceptable
in any circumstance to qualify for the tax credit. Similar to the SSN
requirement under the EITC, Congress’ requirement of a SSN denied the
tax credit for most undocumented immigrants.106
As a result of the SSN requirement, undocumented immigrants as well
as their U.S. citizen spouses and children did not qualify for the 2008
economic stimulus tax credit unless they filed “married filing separately.”
While “married filing separately” filing status provided the opportunity for
an economic stimulus tax credit for U.S. citizen and documented resident
spouses and children who held a SSN this filing status would have under
certain circumstances caused an aggregate tax increase for the family as
well as any additional costs for preparing and filing two tax returns.
However, this result in many cases was better than the absolute denial of
the EITC for married filing separately tax filings.
After the SSN requirement was announced immigrant advocate groups
noted that this requirement also disqualified hundreds of thousands of U.S.
military personnel, foreign high-tech workers and other U.S. citizens and
documented immigrants that were legally present or married to legally
present spouses who did not hold SSNs because they were not eligible to
work and were not working.107 As a result, Congress acted to remedy this
overzealous exclusion of undocumented immigrants, but only for a very
select group of individuals ironically allowing this federal benefit for
certain undocumented immigrants.
In June 2008, President Bush signed into law the Heroes Earnings
Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008 (“HEART 2008”).108 This law
included a provision that exempts married taxpayers who file a joint tax
return from the SSN requirement for the 2008 economic stimulus tax credit
if at least one of the filers was a current member of the Armed Forces.109
Therefore, every member of the Armed Forces qualified for the 2008
105
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economic stimulus tax credit irrespective of their or their spouses’
immigration status. Accordingly, undocumented immigrants married to
members of the Armed Forces qualified for the tax credit. But legally
present and nonworking immigrants who did not qualify for a SSN because
they were not allowed to work did not qualify for the tax credit. Moreover,
their U.S. citizen or legally present and working immigrant spouses had to
file separate tax returns to qualify for the tax credit.
3. The Denial of 2008 Economic Stimulus Tax Credit to
Undocumented Immigrants is a Terrible and Unjust Precedent
The denial of the 2008 economic stimulus tax credit was the first time
that Congress denied a broad-based tax rate cut to U.S. residents based
upon their immigration status.110 This statute is notably different than the
denial of EITC benefits, which some might argue is a federal financial
justice benefit paid through the income tax system. The 2008 tax credit
was a one year tax rate cut. The denial of the tax cut for undocumented
immigrants effectively introduced a tax surcharge or a stealth
undocumented immigrant tax. This is a terrible and unjust precedent.
Bishop John Wester, Chairman of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Committee on Migration, stated:
The decision to prohibit undocumented immigrants from
receiving tax rebates in the stimulus bill highlights the
injustice in our immigration system. It proves that these
workers pay into the tax system and help support our
economy. It also reveals the hypocrisy of our laws. With
one hand our government attempts to deport these
workers, but with the other it holds tight the taxes they pay
into the system. . . . As a democratic and free nation
protective of human rights, we cannot have it both ways.111
D. The Ensign Retroactive Denial of All Tax Credits and Overpayments
for Undocumented Immigrants
While the denial of the 2008 economic stimulus tax credit was the first
110
Similar advance payments of tax cuts in 2001 and 2003 might not have been initially
distributed to individuals who did not hold a Social Security number but these tax cuts were not
statutorily limited to individuals with a Social Security number. As a result, qualifying undocumented
immigrants could enjoy the benefits of the 2001 tax rate cut and the 2003 increased child tax credit on
their 2001and 2003 income tax returns.
111
US Bishops Ask ICE to Assist Families, Communities After Immigration Raids, CATHOLIC
NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 17, 2008), www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/
us_bishops_ask_ice_to_assist_families_communities_after_immigration_raids/.
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denial of a tax rate reduction for undocumented immigrants, antiimmigrant politicians have been proposing bills that include even more
dramatic undocumented immigrant tax surcharges. Former Republican
Senator John Ensign of Nevada has made several egregious undocumented
immigrant tax proposals including a sweeping and intolerant proposal
passed by the Senate in May 2006.112
Senator Ensign’s amendment to the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2006 would have denied any tax credits or tax refunds to
any undocumented immigrant and her family for any taxable year prior to
2006.113 This denial effectively would have created a significant
retroactive tax surcharge for undocumented immigrant families potentially
amounting to thousands of dollars per family. As a result of this provision
undocumented immigrants would be denied all tax credits that have been
and would continue to be allowed to all U.S. citizens and documented
residents including, without limitation, the child tax credit (presently up to
$1,000 per qualifying child), the child and dependent care credit (presently
up to $2,100 for two qualifying children), the American Opportunity tax
credit (presently up to $2,500 per student), the lifetime learning tax credit
(presently up to $2,000 per taxpayer), retirement savings tax credit
(presently up to $2,000 for married filing jointly), the adoption tax credit
(presently up to $13,170 per child) and the foreign tax credit. In addition,
any tax refund of federal income tax withheld (potentially up to thousands
of dollars) could never be refunded. Moreover, any overpayment or refund
from one tax year could not be applied to a tax underpayment for another
tax year.114
The proposed tax treatment of undocumented immigrants buried in the
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 was unprecedented and
grossly unjust. Congress created an egregious retroactive and irrational tax
increase for millions of undocumented immigrants and their families.
Fortunately, while these provisions made it into the bill they were not
passed into law.
Given Congress’ denial of the 2008 economic stimulus tax credit for
undocumented immigrants, similarly devastating tax legislation may be
passed into law in the future. Indeed, while not as comprehensive as the
Ensign amendment, Congressman Sam Johnson (R-Texas) introduced H.R.
1956 in May 2011 to deny the child tax credit to “illegal immigrant”
families because of their immigration status.115 And despite the decade
112
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long allowance of the Additional Child Tax Credit for all lower-income
families with children, including undocumented immigrant families, U.S.
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), ranking member of the Senate Finance
Committee, announced in September 2011 that he would be examining
certain refundable tax credits for “unauthorized workers.”116 If
undocumented immigrant families are denied the child tax credit, a subsidy
for raising dependent children under age 17, millions of whom are U.S.
citizens, their tax burden will increase by billions of dollars each year
further increasing the undocumented immigrant tax.117
E.

Intimidation of Tax Systems and Government Causes Overpayment of
Income Taxes

Denials of the EITC and the economic stimulus tax credits have
effectively created an undocumented immigrant income tax. Ensign’s
proposed retroactive tax increases for undocumented immigrants applying
for documents would have added significantly to this tax. Fortunately, if
we are vigilant about future immigration reform and a just and rational tax
system it will not be included in future immigration, tax, or financial
justice reform. However in addition to the denials of the EITC and the
2008 economic stimulus tax credit, undocumented immigrants face another
effective income tax increase. Because of an overly complex, intimidating
and inaccessible tax system and a fear of the U.S. government, millions of
undocumented immigrants do not file tax returns and, therefore, have
overpaid their federal and state income tax liabilities. This inability to file
for a refund meaningfully increases the undocumented immigrant income
tax for millions of undocumented immigrants.
Wage earners pay their federal and state income taxes through routine
tax withholdings. For low-income wage earners with dependents this
generally results in an overpayment of federal and state income taxes. To
obtain a refund of the overpayment of income taxes paid, refund claims
must be made by filing annual federal and state income tax returns. If a
taxpayer fails to file a federal tax return within three years of the due date
of the tax return she has relinquished her refund and has effectively
116
Bernie Becker, Hatch: Let’s Look at Unauthorized Workers, Tax Credits, ON THE MONEY:
THE HILL’S FINANCE & ECONOMY BLOG (Sept. 2, 2011, 12:55 PM), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/onthe-money/domestic-taxes/179397-hatch-lets-look-at-unauthorized-workers-taxcredits?tmpo=component&print=18page= (quoting the IRS spokeswoman as stating that the law has
been clear for more than a decade that these credits do not depend upon work authorization status).
117
See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT AUTHORIZED
TO WORK IN THE UNITED STATES WERE PAID $4.2 BILLION IN REFUNDABLE CREDITS (2007), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/201141061fr.html; see also Elaine Maag et
al., supra note 9 (describing the child tax credit as a subsidy of $52 billion for almost 35 million
families raising children and demonstrating that only 10 percent of the total expenditures goes to the
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overpaid her tax liabilities.
These forgone tax refunds cannot be offset
against unpaid tax liabilities, which the government can assess, together
with accrued interest and penalties, at anytime if the taxpayer does not file
a tax return.119
Because of vulnerable circumstances millions of undocumented
immigrants do not file their tax returns claiming their legitimate tax
refunds thereby increasing their undocumented immigrant tax. The
vulnerable circumstances that preclude undocumented immigrants from
filing tax returns include lack of education, English language skills, access,
and fear of government officials because of increasing threats of
deportation.120
1. Undocumented Immigrants Do Not File Because of Lack of
Literacy Issues
Lack of literacy seriously compromises any individual’s capacity to
file their tax return. Lack of literacy is a serious matter for undocumented
immigrants. Forty-nine percent of undocumented immigrants have not
completed high school and 32 percent have less than a ninth grade
education.121 Limited education often accompanies limited English
proficiency.
Most undocumented immigrants lack critical English
language skills.122 While the IRS has translated many of its tax forms and
corresponding instructions into Spanish, tax preparation is challenging for
most low-income individuals. Indeed, almost 70 percent of low-income
EITC recipients use a paid tax preparer.123
2.

Undocumented Immigrants Do Not File Because of Fear of
Deportation

Language barriers only enhance the high level of fear undocumented
immigrants have of government officials and deportation. Because of fear
of government officials and agencies, many undocumented immigrants do
not access the very few available government benefits, including
emergency medical care.124 Similarly, the filing of a tax return which will
118
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necessarily include the provision of personal information such as a mailing
address and Form W2s (wage information forms which include the name
and address of any employers) with incorrect SSNs to the federal and state
governments is a staggering exercise at best.
The IRS interprets the filing of a tax return with an ITIN and a Form
W2 with an incorrect SSN as an admission that the wage-earner was not
authorized to work in the United States.125 Alternatively, if the
undocumented immigrant uses the invalid SSN to file her tax return the
undocumented immigrant is committing document fraud. Not surprisingly,
millions of undocumented immigrants are chilled from filing their tax
returns even though it costs them their tax refunds.
3. Undocumented Immigrants Do Not File Because of Lack of Access
Even if undocumented immigrants marshal the courage to file tax
returns, access to ITINs, the number required for every undocumented
immigrant on the tax return, as well as basic tax forms, and instructions
and competent tax preparers are limited. While the IRS is providing more
Spanish language tax forms and instructions, and there are many free tax
assistance programs, these tools are predominately available online.
Seventy-five percent of individuals with income below $15,000 and
greater than 60 percent of individuals with incomes between $15,000 and
$25,000 do not use the Internet.126 The statistics for Internet use among
undocumented immigrants are likely lower than these. Moreover, due to
the high cost of paper and the growth of the Internet, fewer and fewer
public facilities distribute paper tax forms and instructions. While paper
tax forms and instructions are available in IRS offices, these offices are
located in federal government buildings with security guards at every
entrance.
Visiting an IRS office or any government building can be very
intimidating for undocumented immigrants. There have been isolated
incidents where deportation proceedings were commenced for
undocumented immigrants as a result of entering a federal building with an
IRS office to apply for an ITIN.127 Not surprisingly, these incidents, while
isolated and loudly criticized by the National Taxpayer Advocate, do not
encourage the ITIN application process. Undocumented immigrants
cannot file a tax return without an ITIN.
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4. Undocumented Immigrants Do Not File Because of Difficulty of
Obtaining an ITIN
Even without considering the fear of deportation the ITIN application
process is not simple. Because of public concern over the abuse of this
identification number it has become an even slower and more cumbersome
process. Qualifying taxpayers, spouses and each of their dependents must
apply for an ITIN using Form W-7, Application for Individual Taxpayer
Identification Number, which together with its instructions are eight pages
long. The Form W-7 requires personal information including the
individual’s name, address, foreign tax identification number (if any), and
specific reason for obtaining the ITIN. In addition, the IRS requires that
applicants provide documentary evidence to establish their non-citizen
status and identity. Acceptable documentary evidence for this purpose
may include items such as an original (or a certified copy of the original)
passport, driver’s license, birth certificate, certain identity cards, or
immigration documentation. Many undocumented immigrants are not able
to obtain state driver’s licenses or other picture identification because of
their immigration status. Therefore, the only acceptable identification
documents are often original passports and birth certificates, which most
individuals are not going to relinquish through the mail.128
To better focus the application process to tax filing, ITIN applications
must generally be accompanied by a tax return. Therefore, ITIN
applications are typically filed during tax season through a paper return.
As a result, the IRS processing offices suffer a significant bottleneck from
the labor-intensive demands of processing paper returns. The National
Taxpayer Advocate has recognized this issue in her annual report to
Congress in 2008 and 2010, noting that in 2010 the IRS received 1.6
million ITIN applications with 960,000 tax returns. 129 After an application
is received the IRS requires four to six weeks or longer for processing the
information. Indeed, the National Taxpayer Advocate has recognized that
these returns represented $500 million of refunds that were unduly
delayed, up to eight months, by an inexplicably inadequate process.130
The ITIN application process alone, requiring original documents or
certified copies of original documents for each person listed on the tax
return, increases the complexity for the first tax filing, which may
undermine or even realistically preclude the opportunity to file a tax return.
Given these onerous hurdles it is actually surprising that any
128
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130
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undocumented immigrants are able to file income tax returns. However, it
is not surprising that millions do not and instead overpay their federal and
state tax liabilities and increase their undocumented immigrant income
tax.131
III. THE UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT WAGE TAXES
In addition to the undocumented immigrant income tax, undocumented
immigrants bear an undocumented immigrant wage tax. This wage tax is
due to the denial of any Social Security, Medicare, unemployment, and
disability benefits, both federal and state, despite the onerous obligation to
pay Social Security, Medicare and all other federal and state payroll taxes.
In addition in 2009 and 2010 Congress enacted a Social Security tax rate
cut that was not available to many undocumented immigrants.
A. Bearing the Fiscal Burden of Social Security and Medicare Taxes
Unauthorized workers and their employers must each pay Social
Security taxes of 7.65 percent on all wages and net profits from selfemployment for an aggregate tax of 15.3 percent. “Most economists
believe that the burden of most payroll taxes paid by employers falls on the
employees themselves.”132 Therefore, undocumented immigrant working
families likely bear an effective wage tax rate of at least 15.3 percent.
Higher income families will bear a significantly lower effective marginal
wage tax rate because their wages above $106,800 (in 2011) and
investment income are not subject to Social Security tax. Accordingly,
payroll taxes are particularly regressive.
“When both income and payroll taxes are considered, the effective
marginal tax rates on earned income can be extraordinarily high, especially
on low-income workers with children. . . ,[s]ome of the very highest
marginal effective tax rates are imposed on couples earning around
$30,000 a year.”133 Effective marginal tax rates as high as 45 percent (and
likely even higher if state and federal sales, excise, property, and income
taxes are added into the analysis) on hard-working, low-income families
are an onerous and unjust economic burden to bear.134
The amount of Social Security taxes paid by unauthorized workers and
their employers has steadily increased, and is now in the billions of
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dollars.
While some of the mismatches are due to clerical errors, most
exist because unauthorized workers do not qualify for a SSN.136
B. Unauthorized Workers and their Families Do Not Qualify for
Critically Progressive Social Security and Medicare Benefits
Social Security is the largest and most successful financial justice
program in the United States. For more than seventy five years Social
Security has provided critical financial benefits to tens of millions of
individuals every month. Social Security presently pays out $782 billion to
62 million individuals with average benefits of almost $14,000 per year.137
While not means-tested, Social Security presently lifts more than thirteen
million senior citizens and one million children out of poverty.138 Without
Social Security, almost one-half of all senior citizens would live in
poverty.139 For 55 percent of all seniors Social Security benefits comprise
the majority of their income and for 26 percent of all seniors Social
Security benefits comprise 90 percent or more of their income.140
Senior citizens of color are less likely than white senior citizen to
receive Social Security benefits or to have other income from private
pensions or assets. Only about 75 percent of Hispanics age sixty-five or
older receive Social Security benefits.141 Of the Hispanic seniors receiving
Social Security benefits, 76 percent rely on Social Security for more than
one-half of their retirement income and almost 50 percent rely on Social
Security for most of their retirement income.142 Without Social Security
benefits 50 percent of all Hispanic seniors would live in poverty.143
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See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: BETTER COORDINATION AMONG
FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD REDUCE UNIDENTIFIED EARNINGS REPORTS 20–21 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05154.pdf; NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, supra note 47, at 3.
137
The total number of people drawing social security benefits is 62 million. See Press Release,
Rep. Sam Johnson, Johnson Takes the Ways and Means Social Security Helm (Jan. 6, 2011),
http://www.samjohnson.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=219185.
See also
Average Monthly Social Security Benefit for a Retired Worker, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE., http://ssacusthelp.ssa.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/13/~/average-monthly-social-security-benefit-for-a-retiredworker (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (the average monthly benefit is $1,177).
138
Paul N. Van de Water & Arloc Sherman, Social Security Keeps 20 Million Americans Out of
Poverty: A State-By-State Analysis, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 1, 1–2 (2009),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/8-11-10socsec.pdf (exact figures are 1.1 million of children and 13.4 million
of seniors).
139
Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts about Social Security on the Program’s 75th Anniversary, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/PolicyBasics_SocSecTopTen.pdf.
140
Id.
141
Richard Fry et al., Hispanics and the Social Security Debate, PEW HISPANIC CTR., (March 16,
2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/43.pdf.
142
Id. at 7.
143
Id. at 9.
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While Social Security taxes are terribly regressive, Social Security
benefits are notably progressive. The Social Security system is designed to
redistribute meaningful financial resources from high wage earners to
lower wage earners. The redistribution occurs through a very complicated
and opaque benefits formula. The lack of transparency may be one secret
to the Social Security system’s long-time success and overwhelming public
support.
Although Social Security is not means tested, it is a
phenomenally successful antipoverty government assistance program that
bears none of the oppressive stigma of welfare.
Any and all workers over the age of 62 generally are entitled to Social
Security retirement benefits if they have worked in covered employment
for at least forty quarters (ten years).144 A retiree’s monthly benefit is
based upon her thirty-five year earnings history (up to the maximum
annual earnings cap, which is $106,800 for 2011) adjusted for wage
inflation. The highest thirty-five years of wage-inflation adjusted annual
earnings are combined and divided by 420 (12 months x 35 years) to
derive an inflation adjusted monthly amount.
This monthly amount is then put into a formula to derive the retiree’s
monthly retirement benefit at full retirement age. Presently, the retirement
age is 66, but is increasing to age 67 for those born in 1960 or later.145 The
benefits formula is progressive.146 For a worker turning 62 in 2011, the
monthly benefit equals 90 percent of the first $749, plus 32 percent of the
next $3,768 (if any) plus 15 percent of any remaining amount. This
monthly amount is decreased if a retiree starts her benefits before her full
retirement age or increased if a retiree continues to work beyond her full
retirement age.147
In addition to retiree benefits, the Social Security system provides
monthly benefits for a retiree’s spouse, dependents, and survivors. A
retiree’s nonworking spouse can retire and receive a benefit derived solely
from her spouse’s benefit. This benefit is equal to 50 percent of the
worker’s benefit. If the retiree dies leaving a surviving spouse, she is
entitled to a monthly benefit equal to 100 percent of the retiree’s benefit
for her lifetime and any dependents will also receive monthly benefits
through age eighteen.148
144

See Prajna Tuladhar, There’s Something About Mexico: Exploring the Controversy, Costs, and
Benefits of a Social Security Totalization Agreement with Our Neighbor to the South, 15 ELDER L.J.
581, 585 (2007).
145
See Soc. Sec. Admin., The Full Retirement Age is Increasing, available at http://ssa.gov/
pubs/ageincrease.htm.
146
NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, supra note 47, at 3.
147
For a comprehensive review of the Social Security benefits formula, see Francine J. Lipman &
James E. Williamson, Social Security Benefits 101, ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER May 2011 at 11,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1826404.
148
See generally, Survivor Planner, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://ssa.gov/survivorplan/
onyourown.htm (last reviewed or modified Jan. 3, 2012).
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The Social Security benefit formula ensures that lower-wage workers
and their families will receive a critically higher return on their
contributions than higher wage workers. The current Social Security
system particularly favors married one-worker large families with low
lifetime earnings. Immigrants benefit substantially from this formula
because, on average, they have lower incomes, a higher incidence of
disability, more children per family, and longer life expectancies.149 One
study by Harvard economists found that Hispanics enjoy a Social Security
rate of return that is 35–60 percent higher than the rate of return for the
general population.150
A lower-wage worker, earning $24,000 average annual earnings for the
last thirty-five years, retiring at full retirement at age 66 in 2011 would
receive tax-free Social Security benefits of $12,888 per year for the rest of
her life. If she were married to a nonworking spouse, upon his retirement
at full retirement age they would receive tax-free Social Security benefits
of $19,332 per year or more than 80 percent of their pre-retirement income.
This critical antipoverty relief, which is contingent upon thirty-five years
of hard-work and steady payment of regressive Social Security taxes, is not
available to unauthorized workers and their families.
Unauthorized workers who pay more than $12 billion dollars of Social
Security taxes each year on tens of billions of dollars of wages (more than
$835 billion through 2007) will never qualify for these retirement benefits
or Medicare unless they are legally present in the United States and obtain
work authorization. For decades, only individuals who were legally
present in the United States could qualify for Social Security benefits.
Since 2004, it has become even more difficult to qualify for Social
Security benefits. After President Bush signed the Social Security
Protection Act of 2004 into law, a noncitizen who files for Social Security
benefits based on a SSN assigned on or after January 1, 2004, is required to
have work authorization at the time the SSN is assigned or at some later
time.151 Therefore, in addition to being legally present undocumented
immigrants with 2004 or later issued SSNs must receive work
authorization to qualify for Social Security benefits.
Only if all of these requirements are satisfied will a former
undocumented immigrant qualify for Social Security benefits. If a former
undocumented immigrant qualifies for Social Security benefits, they will
be based on all Social Security-covered earnings regardless of their work

149
Fernando Torres-Gil et al., The Importance of Social Security to the Hispanic Community,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, (June 28, 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-2805socsec3.pdf.
150
Jason Furman, Top Ten Facts on Social Security’s 70th Anniversary, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES (Aug. 11, 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/files/8-11-05socsec.pdf.
151
Social Security Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, § 211, 118 Stat. 493, 518 (2004).
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status during the earning period.
However, the retiree has the burden of
proving her earnings history and only wages that are reported to the SSA,
and not paid “under the table,” count toward the required forty quarters of
earnings to qualify for Social Security benefits and Medicare.
Because unauthorized workers do not have a SSN the SSA will not
have an accurate record of their earnings history.
Accordingly,
unauthorized workers must provide satisfactory documentation to the SSA
evidencing their annual earnings history. Currently, the SSA has a policy
of assisting, and not prosecuting these workers because the SSA is charged
with maintaining correct earnings records.153 However, this policy is
subject to change immediately. It is a felony to falsely use a SSN carrying
a penalty of up to $5,000 and five years in prison.154 Even if unauthorized
workers become documented residents with work authorization many are
too afraid to risk coming forward even to receive life-changing Social
Security credits for decades of work.
Because of complexity and lack of transparency in the Social Security
system, most U.S. citizens do not understand how their benefits accrue.
Unauthorized workers, who often lack critical English language skills, an
education, and any familiarity with the U.S. tax and retirement systems are
likely unaware that this substantial benefit is available to them.155 If they
have ten years of covered wages, are lawfully present and obtain work
authorization, they have a lifetime of meaningful, antipoverty family
benefits awaiting them amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars.
However, some members of Congress are trying to deny any possibility of
Social Security benefits with respect to unauthorized work despite the
requirement to pay Social Security taxes on these wages.
C. Congress Narrowly Defeats a Provision to Deny Social Security
Benefits to Otherwise Eligible Lawfully Present Immigrant Workers
In May 2006, the Senate narrowly defeated (50–49) former Senator
John Ensign’s amendment to deny Social Security quarterly credits to
legally present immigrant workers for work performed while the workers
did not have a SSN authorizing employment, but upon which the worker

152

Dawn Nuschler & Alison Siskin, Social Security Benefits for Noncitizens: Current Policy and
Legislation CRS REPORT FOR CONG. (May 11, 2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/46681.pdf.
153
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE REPORT: SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION BENEFITS RELATED TO UNAUTHORIZED WORK 4–5 (2003), available at
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-03-03-23053.pdf.
154
42 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). But see Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009).
155
See Randy Capps et al., The Health and Well-Being of Young Children of Immigrants, URBAN
INST. (2004), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311139_Childrenimmigrants.pdf.
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and her employer paid Social Security and Medicare taxes.
This is not
the first time this economic injustice has been proposed nor will it be the
last. In 2003, the Senate Finance Committee considered a similar proposal,
but the then SSA Commissioner stated that the proposal was not
practicable. The Commissioner stated in writing that the information
regarding the immigration status necessary to implement any accurate
adjudication of benefits under this proposal did not exist.157 In February
2008, the now head of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee Social
Security proposed a similar bill (H.R. 5515, 110th Congress).158
Denying Social Security benefits for work upon which taxes were paid
would deter tax compliance for the millions of unauthorized workers and
their employers. According to the SSA’s Chief Actuary three-quarters of
unauthorized workers pay payroll taxes.159 If this proposal were
implemented, employers may choose to pay unauthorized workers cash
“under the table” and forgo sending tax payments or any information to the
IRS or SSA.
This unjust strategy comes at a significant cost to the U.S. government.
The National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson has warned, “a change in tax
compliance of even one percentage point equates to an annual loss of more
than $20 billion of revenue to the federal government.”160 Moreover,
“[o]ver the next 75 years, new immigrants will provide a net benefit of
approximately $611 billion in present value to the Social Security
system.”161 In short, this proposal is not only fundamentally unjust and unAmerican it is poor fiscal policy that could undermine the continuation of
the most successful financial justice program for qualifying retirees and
their families.
The denial of life-changing Social Security and Medicare benefits for
undocumented immigrant families coupled with the requirement to pay all
employment taxes (and in 2009 and 2010 in many cases at a higher tax rate
than similarly situated U.S. citizens and legally working residents) results
in an oppressive undocumented immigrant wage tax. The Social Security
tax rate for undocumented immigrants was higher than for similarly
situated U.S. citizens and legally working residents in 2009 and 2010
156

152 CONG. REC. S4746-47 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy & vote

results).
157
Jonathan Blazer, Immigration Reform and Access to Public Benefits: The Return of an Uneasy
Coupling, NAT’L IMMIGRATION CTR. (May 15, 2006), http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/cir/
cirandbenefits_2006-5-15.pdf.
158
154 CONG. REC. H2168-69 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Johnson).
159
152 CONG. REC. S4742 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
160
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA-06-100, OPTIONS EXIST TO ENABLE DATA
SHARING BETWEEN IRS AND USCIS BUT EACH PRESENTS CHALLENGES 31 (2005).
161
Proposal to Strip Workers of Social Security Earnings Based on Prior Employment Status:
Bad for the System and an Affront to Our Values, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER (2007),
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/CIR/ensign_ss_amdmt_2007-02-28.pdf.
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because of the Making Work Pay tax credit.
D. Making Work Pay (Social Security Tax Rate Cut) Tax Credit in 2009
and 2010
When Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) they put into
effect an exclusion from employee Social Security taxes (6.2 percent tax
rate cut) on up to $6,451 of earned income ($12,903 of earned income for
married filing jointly taxpayers).162 The exclusion was implemented
through the income tax system as the Making Work Pay tax credit, a
refundable income tax credit of up to $400 ($6,451 x .062) for single
taxpayers or $800 ($12,903 x .062) for married filing jointly taxpayers.163
The Making Work Pay tax credit was the centerpiece of the tax reduction
provisions of the ARRA. President Obama strongly pursued its inclusion in
the legislation because it would put money back into the pockets of
workers.
Nevertheless not all workers in America qualified for the credit.
Because the credit was targeted to lower and middle wage earners it
phased-out above modified adjusted gross income levels of $95,000
($190,000 for married filing jointly taxpayers). In addition, a SSN is
required for the credit. Therefore, undocumented immigrants and their
families do not qualify for this credit. However, in an interesting departure
from the 2008 economic stimulus tax credit and somewhat consistent with
the HEART 2008 amendments, married filing jointly taxpayers only need
one SSN to qualify for the full credit.164 This relaxation of the Social
Security requirement is irrespective of the couples’ military status (so
broader than the HEART 2008 amendment). Moreover, the SSN does not
have to belong to the working spouse. As a result, if an undocumented
immigrant is married to an individual who qualifies for a SSN the couple
can qualify for the tax credit in 2009 and 2010. Nevertheless, Congress’
SSN requirement denies the 2009 and 2010 Social Security tax rate cut to
millions of unauthorized workers who cannot file with a spouse with a
Social Security number and as a result are paying Social Security taxes at a
higher tax rate.

162
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 § 1001, 123 Stat.
115, 309 (2009).
163
Id.
164
See Most Workers Need to File New Schedule M; Making Work Pay Credit Offers Tax Savings
Up to $800, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (last reviewed or updated Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=217793,00.html
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E. Social Security Tax Rate Cut for ALL Workers in 2011
In 2011, Congress enacted and President Obama signed into law the
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation
Act of 2010.165 The 2010 Act cut the employees’ Social Security tax rate
from 6.2 percent to 4.2 percent on all wages and self-employment
income.166 This one-year 2 percent tax cut on up to $106,800 of wages is
projected to generate up to $2,136 tax savings per worker or $110
billion.167 Unlike the 2009 and 2010 Making Work Pay tax credits this tax
rate cut is not phased out for higher wage earners, but is capped at the
maximum amount of wages subject to Social Security taxes. Because of
its design more than 40 percent of the $110 billion in tax savings goes to
households with income levels at or above $100,000. Twenty-five percent
of the tax savings goes to households with income under $50,000. By
contrast, more than half of the 2009 and 2010 Making Work Pay tax credit
went to households making less than $50,000 and just one-sixth to those
with income over $100,000.168
However, because the Social Security tax rate cut is implemented
through the payroll tax system and not the income tax system all workers
in the payroll tax system receive the tax rate cut including all unauthorized
workers. Accordingly, while these workers do not qualify for Social
Security benefits or Medicare, at least in 2011 as compared to 2009 and
2010, they are not paying a higher Social Security tax rate than similarly
situated U.S. citizens and authorized workers.
Undocumented immigrants are subject to and pay all payroll taxes
even though they do not qualify for the benefits provided by the Social
Security, Medicare, disability, unemployment, and other worker benefit
systems. Undocumented immigrant wage taxes are in addition to the
requirement to pay all federal, state, and local sales, use, excise, property,
and income taxes.

165

Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-312, § 601, 124 Stat. 3296, 3297 (2010).
166
Id. (reducing the payroll tax rate by 2.0 percent).
167
Emily Brandon, 6 Ways to Spend Your Social Security Payroll Tax Cut, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT’S PLANNING TO RETIRE BLOG (Mar. 10, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/
planning-to-retire/2011/03/10/6-ways-to-spend-your-social-security-payroll-tax-cut.
168
Roberton Williams, The Paradox of Thrift, or What to do With My Payroll Tax Cut?, TAX
POLICY
CENTER.
URBAN-BROOKINGS
TAX
POLICY
CTR.
(Feb.
9,
2011),
http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2011/02/09/the-paradox-of-thrift-or-what-to-do-with-my-payroll-taxcut/.
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IV. THE UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT TAX: AN ECONOMIC
REDISTRIBUTION FROM WORKING POOR UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT
FAMILIES TO AMERICANS FROM SEA TO SHINING SEA
As a great American once said nothing is as certain as taxes.169 I hope
that this Article has made certain the truth of the statement that
Indeed, undocumented
“undocumented immigrants pay taxes.”170
immigrants have paid, are paying, and will continue to pay billions of
dollars in taxes every year to federal, state, and local governments across
this great nation. These direct tax payments are equal to hundreds of
billions of dollars and indirectly enrich all Americans from sea to shining
sea.
The undocumented immigrant tax described in this Article includes
both additional income taxes and wage tax burdens. The undocumented
immigrant income tax, which includes the denial of the EITC, was
increased in 2008 with the even more problematic denial of the 2008
economic stimulus tax credit. In addition, because of challenging filing
requirements and lack of literacy and access, millions of undocumented
immigrants overpay their federal and state income tax liabilities because
they are not able to file for tax refunds. Moreover, millions of
undocumented immigrants pay billions of dollars in Social Security (at a
higher rate in 2009 and 2010 than U.S. citizens and other authorized
workers because of the denial of the Making Work Pay tax credit) and
Medicare taxes as well as disability and unemployment taxes every year
without any corresponding benefits. More recently, former Republican
Senator John Ensign of Nevada has proposed amendments to
comprehensive immigration reform acts that have threatened to increase
retroactively “the undocumented immigrant tax” even more significantly.
Consequently, undocumented immigrants are subject to greater tax burdens
than U.S. citizens in the same circumstances even though they do not
qualify for the broad safety net of government benefits (other than
emergency medical care and primary and secondary education, which they
sometimes reject because of fear and vulnerability) or have the right to
vote.171
Without the opportunity to vote or even to be heard in any meaningful
sense undocumented immigrants have little or no recourse for injustices.
As a result, they suffer daily. Their suffering translates into lower prices
169

The full quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin is “Our Constitution is in actual operation;
everything appears to promise that it will last; but nothing in this world is certain but death and taxes.”
Jeffery L. Yablon, As Certain as Death: Quotations About Taxes (2010 Edition), TAX ANALYSTS
(2009), http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/yablon.pdf.
170
Undocumented Immigrants as Taxpayers, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Nov. 1, 2007),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/undocumented-immigrants-taxpayers.
171
See Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and the Current
Prospects for Change, 18 LAW & INEQ. 271, 282–85 (2000).
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for countless goods and services and lower taxes in America. As
Americans we have an obligation to speak out for those without a voice.
You have a voice and a vote; exercise them with this knowledge and the
goal of financial justice for all.
How long will hate and prejudice thrive in America? As Dr. King said
almost fifty years ago:
The battle is in our hands. And we can answer with
creative nonviolence the call to higher ground to which the
new directions of our struggle summons us. The road
ahead is not altogether a smooth one. There are no broad
highways that lead us easily and inevitably to quick
solutions. But we must keep going.172

172

King, supra note 4.

Coalition, Cross-Cultural Lawyering, and
Intersectionality: Immigrant Identity as a Barrier to
Effective Legal Counseling for Domestic Violence
Victims
JESSICA H. STEIN†
I. INTRODUCTION
If it is so hard to work together, if the gulfs in
experience are so wide, if the false universals of the
modern age are truly bankrupt, what need binds us? What
justifies unity in our quest for self-knowledge? My answer
is that we cannot, at this point in history, engage fruitfully
in jurisprudence without engaging in coalition, without
coming out of separate places to meet one another across
all the positions of privilege and subordination that we
hold in relation to one another.
-Mari J. Matsuda1
This is a true story. It is the story of how the law
punished a man for speaking about his legal rights; of how,
after punishing him, it silenced him; of how, when he did
speak, he was not heard. This pervasive and awful
oppression was subtle and, in a real way, largely
unintentional. I know because I was one of his oppressors.
I was his lawyer.
-Clark D. Cunningham2
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Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1183, 1188 (1991).
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Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1299 (1992).
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Domestic violence victims face enormous obstacles in their struggle
for safety and security. Immigrant domestic violence victims face even
greater challenges because they have additional lethality factors and
impediments.3 Many articles have discussed the “external” barriers to
legal and social services. These articles note the hesitation that immigrants
have in contacting the police due to a fear that the police are the same
organization as the Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency (“ICE”)
or at least due to a fear that the police will report them to ICE.4 They also
fear that police will not understand them because of their poor English
language skills,5 that, based on past experiences in their native country,
police will conspire with their abuser,6 or that police will arrest them
instead.7 Some do not know that domestic violence is against the law in
this country.8 They are afraid of going to family court if they are
undocumented because they believe that discovery of their status will
prevent them from receiving services.9 They are afraid of leaving their
husbands because their husbands are the only people who can vouch for
their status to ICE, or their husbands are in possession of their immigration
or identification documents.10 They are also afraid because they may have
no marketable skills and no means to support their children or themselves,
3
Lethality factors are those actions by the batterer that increase the level of danger for the victim,
also referred to as “high risk factors.” Janet A. Johnson & Victoria L. Lutz, Death by Intimacy: Risk
Factors for Domestic Violence, 20 PACE L. REV. 263, 282–83 (2000). General lethality factors for all
victims include: the victim’s “gut level” feelings of danger, threats, use of or access to weapons,
obsessiveness about victim or family, actual or perceived separation, stalking behaviors, depression,
strangulation acts, access to partner, children, or family members, increase in degree of dangerous
behaviors, upcoming symbolic or memorable days (such as an anniversary), personal risks taken by the
abuser such as public exposure, alcohol and drug abuse, repeated calls to law enforcement, hostagetaking, and prior history of criminal misconduct. Id. at 282–83, 282 n.89.
4
See, e.g., Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative Analysis of
Conversations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 138, 179–180
(2004); Tien-Li Loke, Note, Trapped in Domestic Violence: The Impact of United States Immigration
Laws on Battered Immigrant Women, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 589, 591 (1997).
5
See, e.g., Karin Wang, Comment, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses
from the Battered Women’s Movement and the Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 162–63
(1996).
6
Loke, supra note 4, at 592.
7
See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 181; Wang, supra note 5, at 163.
8
See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 182–83; Loke, supra note 4, at 592; Felicia E. Franco,
Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 99, 99–101
(1996).
9
Sometimes this fear is warranted. Many undocumented immigrants are not eligible to receive
legal services from organizations that receive funding from the Legal Services Corporation. Sarah M.
Wood, Note, VAWA’s Unfinished Business: The Immigrant Women Who Fall Through the Cracks, 11
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 141, 152 (2004).
10
See, e.g., id. at 142 (“The structure of immigration law, however, is the greatest barrier to
reporting crimes of domestic violence. Women who are hoping to obtain legal status through their
husbands inevitably fear that reporting abuse will jeopardize their chances for legal immigration, and
undocumented women whose husbands or partners are themselves undocumented face the additional
threat that their abusers will report them to immigration authorities, and that they will be deported as a
result.”).
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especially because their lack of documentation may preclude them from
receiving government benefits.11
Fewer commentators have noted the “internal” barriers that immigrant
domestic violence victims face. These internal barriers apply specifically
to the victim’s relationship with her attorney and counselors, or those from
whom she seeks help and guidance in her struggle with external barriers.12
Language in this respect can be as large an internal barrier as it is an
external barrier. The attorney-client relationship is defined by a sense of
trust and confidentiality.13 When an interpreter is required, even one who
translates word-for-word, there is a strain on that relationship. When an
interpreter seems to be influencing a client—or a yes or no question seems
to take ten minutes with back and forth between the client and the
interpreter—it is difficult to assess exactly what is going on and how to
handle the situation. The second and larger issue, which seems to be
intertwined with the first, is one of culture.
Cultural differences between attorney and client are the focus of this
Note. These differences can be the most difficult barrier to overcome and
the hardest to define when working with immigrant victims of domestic
violence. This issue also seems to be the most puzzling and frustrating to
attorneys. Many of the answers proposed can be uncomfortable and could
offend a progressive, liberal sense of lawyering.14 For example, one author
has suggested the idea of ethnic matching for attorneys and clients as the
only means of solving this problem.15 Others have stressed the need for
11
See Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and
Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2006) (“[U]ndocumented immigrants are
barred from almost all government benefits, including food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, Medicaid, federal housing programs, Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment
Insurance, Social Security, Medicare, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Generally, the only
benefits federally required for undocumented immigrants are emergency medical care, subject to
financial and category eligibility, and elementary and secondary public education.”).
12
In no way do I wish to suggest that there are no male domestic violence victims or to denigrate
the experiences of men facing family or relationship-based violence. This paper focuses on female
victims of domestic violence because this is the population with whom I have experience working. I
also do not mean to suggest that women who have women partners do not experience abuse in their
relationships.
13
See, e.g., Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me”: Addressing a Black
Defendant’s Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3
(2002) (“Trust is essential to establishing rapport [in the attorney-client relationship] . . . . Trust and
rapport, in turn, enhance attorney effectiveness which, correspondingly, promotes justice . . . .”).
14
For instance, Naomi Cahn discusses the difficulties in addressing race and culture in the legal
representation process. “[I]t is important for advocates to be aware of how race affects the
representation process, and for advocates to use race to challenge the legal requirements placed on their
clients. The difficult issues concern the relevance of race and deciding how to use it in the advocacy
process.” Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 965, 988–89 (1997).
15
See Shani M. King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services
Organizations Need African American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2008)
(“Race, especially for African Americans, has a gravity that cannot be understood if taken out of its
socio-political-legal and historical context. The experience of African Americans cannot be fully
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cultural competency training and education for attorneys to enhance their
understanding of their clients, to gain their trust, and to more competently
advocate for their interests.16 Each suggestion is worthy of extensive
discussion and thoughtful study, and can be integrated into a unified plan
of action that will address the issues that hinder immigrant victims’ access
to and continued effective use of legal services.
In Part II of this Note, I present a narrative of my experience working
with a particular immigrant victim. The story of Ms. H illustrates how
culture can erect an internal barrier to effective legal counseling of
immigrant victims of domestic violence. In Part III, I discuss the
intersectionality of immigrant domestic violence victims more thoroughly,
addressing some of the cultural differences that may lead to difficulties in
the attorney-client relationship. Finally, in Part IV, I address several
possible solutions, an amalgamation of which, if implemented, could break
down some of the barriers that immigrant victims face and lead the way to
improved access to effective and compassionate legal counseling.
I conclude that the problems faced by immigrant victims in seeking
help can only be solved by the recognition of the intersectionalities
apparent in immigrant domestic violence cases, by the use and
encouragement of cross-cultural lawyering, requiring a sincere effort by
attorneys to be culturally competent, and by the forceful coming together
of a coalition of advocates ready to tackle and solve this problem. The
term coalition traditionally has referred to coalition-building, or the coming
together of different groups of people to engender discussion or to solve a
problem. When discussing this type of coalition, I will refer to coalitionbuilding. I use the term coalition in this Note as it is defined by Mari
Matsuda in her groundbreaking article “Beside My Sister, Facing the
Enemy.”17
Coalition, as Matsuda sees it, is a deepened and expanded view of
traditional coalition-building.18 Matsuda argues that coalition-building is
“merely the beginning of the worth” of coalition.19 True coalition requires
communicated in books, documentaries, law school, or by cultural competence trainers—it is
something that must be lived. Therefore, legal services organizations cannot improve their service
delivery to clients by simply hiring cultural competence trainers.”).
16
See Leslie Espinoza Garvey, The Race Card: Dealing with Domestic Violence in the Courts, 11
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 298 (2003) (“Lawyers need to develop cultural and race
competencies. Other professions, such as psychology and medicine, recognize the need to train
professionals to develop these skills.”); see also Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence,
Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219, 229–30 (2002) (“In this new millennium,
multicultural competence is an essential component of good legal practice. But acquiring multicultural
competence requires facing discomforting truths about ourselves and our society, especially for those
of us who enjoy the privileges of the dominant culture.”).
17
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 1188.
18
See generally id.
19
Id. at 1184.
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us to acknowledge the struggle of others while we struggle to end our own
subordination and to recognize that our own subordination cannot end
while others are still subordinated.20 “Working in coalition forces us to
look for both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination,
helping us to realize that no form of subordination ever stands alone.”21 It
is in this context that I frame my discussion of coalition as a method of
breaking down the barriers that prevent immigrant victims of domestic
violence from seeking and obtaining help.
II. MY CLIENT DOESN’T TRUST ME BECAUSE I AM NOT KOREAN
When I arrived for my 1L summer internship in the Matrimonial and
Family Law Unit (“FLU”)22 at the New York Legal Assistance Group
(“NYLAG”), I thought of myself as the culturally sensitive, accepting,
knowledgeable, educated product of a progressive upbringing and liberal
arts education. I felt more than adequately prepared to deal with the
diverse clients with whom I would be working and to understand their
legal issues. I underwent the FLU training to understand the best way to
work with domestic violence victims, how race affects domestic violence,
how education and job skills can trap women in these situations, and how
class identity can shift legal outcomes. I learned about working with
immigrant victims by attending trainings on the Violence Against Women
Act, self-petitioning, and applying for asylum.23 Through my training, I
acquired practical skills for helping these victims attain legal permanent
residency and citizenship. I also was taught more generally about housing
issues affecting domestic violence victims and about the laws affecting
custody, divorce, visitation, and the termination of parental rights.
Additionally, I underwent cultural competency training as part of the
Courtroom Advocates Project (CAP), which was provided by the
I also learned the proper
organization Sanctuary for Families.24
20
For instance, when feminist scholars and critical race scholars come together to build a
coalition, they must engage in coalition by acknowledging their own contributions to subordination and
by acknowledging the intersectionality of sexism and racism. We must recognize that “all forms of
subordination are interlocking and mutually reinforcing.” Id. at 1189.
21
Id.
22
I will refer to the Unit as the FLU, which is the acronym used within the department.
23
The Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) was designed to prevent violence against
women generally in the United States, but also it attempted to improve conditions for immigrant
women victims of domestic violence, providing a path to citizenship through self-petitioning. Prior to
VAWA, women had to be sponsored by their spouses in order to apply for citizenship. For a good
outline of the legislative history behind VAWA and a historical look at immigration policies affecting
victims of domestic violence, see Katerina Shaw, Note, Barriers to Freedom: Continued Failure of
U.S. Immigration Laws to Offer Equal Protection to Immigrant Battered Women, 15 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 663, 666–73 (2009) (describing how even the most recent amendments to VAWA still leave
out a significant portion of battered women, and concluding that current immigration law is still
inadequate to protect victims).
24
CAP is a program under the auspices of Sanctuary for Families and NYLAG, which provides
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procedures with which to successfully advocate for my client in the
system—how to request translation services in court, how to have a client
report to the police in her native language—and all of the rights that must
be provided to accommodate victims in New York. I learned how to
interview victims and how to be sensitive to their needs. I learned how to
develop trust with clients by listening to their stories and then by
reconstructing their narratives. I learned to avoid asking certain questions
and to make my goal the same as my client’s. It was not my place to judge
the client’s feelings or decisions as long as those goals and decisions did
not make her unsafe, in which case I was taught to ask her whether she
would feel safe with the outcome. At that point, the decision was hers. I
was not to be another patronizing voice in the victim’s life. Ultimately, I
was taught that it is the victim’s decision and the victim’s life. The
victim’s voice is the only voice to listen to and the victim knows the best
way to keep herself and her children safe. With all of that in mind, I was
still expected to accurately gather extremely private information from our
clients so that I would be able to help represent them zealously and
effectively.25
The clients with whom I met at NYLAG that summer were from
places as diverse as Ukraine and Guyana. They varied in religion,
ethnicity, age, and country of origin. I felt in almost every case that I was
able to relate to the client and to bridge the gap in understanding resulting
from cultural factors that presented during my assistance in their
representation. Most clients with whom I worked over the course of the
summer appreciated the way that the FLU did business because the FLU
required the unit to act sensitively and compassionately. It was often
difficult to unravel the complicated stories of abuse from a client who was
frightened, confused, and hurt. Generally, though, where I was charged
with doing so by my supervisors, I was able to piece together a narrative of
the client’s life, documenting the first, most recent, and most violent
episodes of domestic violence. I always asked the client what she
considered the worst incident of abuse and many times that incident was
not the type of incident that I would think of, as an outsider and as a law
student not yet fully experienced in working with victims. For instance,
one client discussed an incident which had taken place almost twenty years
learning opportunities for summer associates and law students in New York. The students assist
domestic violence victims with petitions for Orders of Protection and follow the case by attending
adjournment dates and advocating for the victims in Family Court or the Integrated Domestic Violence
FOR
FAMILIES,
Courts.
Coutroom
Advocates
Project,
SANCTUARY
http://www.sanctuaryforfamilies.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=78&Itemid=162
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
25
All work that I completed at NYLAG was performed under the supervision of the FLU Staff
Attorneys, as well as the Director and Associate Director of the FLU. I advocated for these clients
utilizing a Student Practice Order.
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earlier when her husband took her newborn son out of the house for over
twelve hours without telling her and threatened that he would never bring
the baby back. The child was still breastfeeding at the time and was not
able to digest solid foods. In her history of abuse, the client suffered
violent attacks at her husband’s hands that would make most people cringe,
but this incident represented the pinnacle of her loss of control and her fear
for her child’s life, and it remained with her. Even when I did not fully
understand a client’s mixed feelings or when it took several meetings over
a number of weeks to establish the chain of incidents over a span of time, I
was able to unfold my clients’ narratives—with one exception.
That exception was a client, Ms. H, with whom my supervisor and I
began working about a month and a half into my summer. Ms. H was the
client to whom I felt closest, the client about whom I woke up in the night
worrying, and the client whom I could least understand. With all of my
cultural competence, my liberal education, and all of my experiences, Ms.
H was inaccessible to me. Ms. H had moved to the United States only
eight months earlier from South Korea. Her husband, a Korean-American,
was in the United States Armed Forces and had been stationed in South
Korea where the couple met, wed, and had a child. Unlike many
immigrant victims of domestic violence, Ms. H was a United States citizen
because of a program that allows military spouses a shortcut to
citizenship.26
Ms. H’s case included the worst physical violence that I had
encountered in my short time as an intern in the FLU, even though I had
worked on some fairly extreme cases. Ms. H also was unusual in that she
had more documentation of both her injuries and of the violent incidents
she had experienced than any other client whom I had met. For example, a
closed circuit camera in a South Korean indoor parking garage had
captured Ms. H’s husband running her over with his car at full speed. She
had video footage of her husband playing with guns and knives next to the
couple's then one year-old child. She had medical records and photographs
documenting her broken ribs and arms and all of her fractures. She had a
Domestic Incident Report from the police department documenting one of
the recent violent incidents as well as her brother, who had partially
26
See 8 U.S.C. § 1430(b) (2006) (“Any person . . . whose spouse is . . . a citizen of the United
States . . . in the employment of the Government of the United States [and is] regularly stationed abroad
in such employment, and . . . who is in the United States at the time of naturalization, and . . . who
declares before the Attorney General in good faith an intention to take up residence within the United
States immediately upon the termination of such employment abroad of the citizen spouse, may be
naturalized upon compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws, except that no prior
residence or specified period of physical presence within the United States or within a State or a district
of the Service in the United States or proof thereof shall be required.”). Military spouses, however, are
considered “within the United States” while still abroad if they marry abroad and their spouses are
engaged by “official orders” abroad which keep them from returning to the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1430(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
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witnessed the event documented by the report and who was willing to
testify on her behalf.27 The images of Ms. H’s abuse will probably haunt
me for my entire life.
Despite the volume of evidence present in this case (which led me,
perhaps naively, to initially believe it would be an easy victory), it proved
to be the most difficult and emotionally taxing case that I worked on
during my summer at NYLAG. NYLAG was retained initially only on
Ms. H’s divorce case. She had already been a complaining witness in the
criminal case against Mr. H for which he had accepted a plea deal.28 There
was an ongoing neglect case against Mr. H initiated by the Administration
for Children’s Services (“ACS”) in which Ms. H was considered the nonrespondent mother29 and was represented by what is called an 18-B, a court
appointed attorney.30 Ms. H was also represented by the 18-B in her
family offense petition against her husband, as well as her custody and
visitation cases. She had temporary orders of protection against him issued
in both family and criminal court, which were renewed periodically and
always expired on the following adjournment date.31
The fact that Ms. H wanted to reconcile with her husband was not what
27

During the incident documented in the police report, Ms. H had been in her in-laws’ adjoining
apartment when her husband began screaming at her. She ran up the stairs to the bedroom she shared
with her husband and locked the door. She immediately picked up the phone and called her brother.
While she was on the phone asking her brother for help, her husband kicked the door down and began a
storm of kicking, punching, and spitting on her after dragging her by her hair. Her brother was on the
phone for the duration of the attack and called the police somehow, alerting them to the incident.
28
During my entire summer, with one exception, I never witnessed a criminal domestic violence
case end in anything but a plea bargain from which the batterer received a “Violation” and was ordered
to enter “batterer’s intervention” in conjunction with a full criminal order of protection. A violation is
a lesser charge than a misdemeanor. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2008). Even for
inflicting serious injuries, which if inflicted on anyone but an intimate partner would have resulted in a
jail term for the batterer, abusers never once received jail time, or even pled to anything but a violation.
29
Historically, in New York, neglect petitions were filed against domestic violence victim
mothers as well as their abusive husbands. The idea was that the mother was not protecting her
children and was neglecting them by staying with her abuser. This practice ended with the landmark
court case of Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004). NYLAG filed an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of the respondent mother. For a good article about Sharwline Nicholson’s struggle with
ACS and her court battle, see Wendy Davis, Active Parenting: Her boyfriend beat her so badly she had
to be hospitalized. Then the city took her kids because of it. Meet the mom who’s turning a legal fight
into a source of inspiration for other two-time victims,, CITY LIMITS (May 13, 2002),
http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/viewarticle.cfm?article_id=2773.
30
N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney Supp. 2011). The attorneys are referred to as 18-B
because § 722 falls under Article 18-B: Representation of Persons Accused of Crime or Parties Before
the Family Court or Surrogate’s Court.
31
Unfortunately the 18-B assigned to her neglect and family offense cases, though a very nice
man, was not particularly familiar with working with victims of domestic violence. He would leave her
alone in the waiting area where her husband would also be waiting. He neglected to prepare her for a
meeting where she would be required to discuss painful memories in front of the attorney for the child,
the ACS attorney conducting the inquest into her husband’s neglect of their child, myself, and some
others. She was terrified. I met her at the courthouse early in order to discuss the meeting with her and
assuage her fears. The 18-B attorney was mostly absent. The neglect case was coming to a head and
as soon as there was a resolution to that case, NYLAG planned to take over Ms. H’s representation on
all of her various dockets.
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was frustrating to me about her case. My supervisor and I saw many
clients who openly wanted to reconcile or behaviorally seemed to indicate
as much. For instance, in one case, a client accepted several daily phone
calls from her abuser even though she had a full “stay away” order of
protection from him prohibiting all contact, even via third parties.32 Many
clients were comfortable with varying degrees of contact, or if they were
not, they were comfortable with their FLU attorney dealing with the
violation in a variety of different ways. For instance, technically these
women could hang up the phone upon receipt of a phone call from their
batterer and call the police, who would be required to arrest the batterer for
violating the order. In my summer at NYLAG, I never encountered a
client who thought this approach was the best way to handle the violation.
Some of these clients would call the NYLAG office and tell us about the
contact. NYLAG would file a violation petition with the court and
personally serve it on the batterer. Sometimes the client would not even
want NYLAG to file the violation petition at all. None of that was
surprising to me. I was taught that victims know what they need to do to
keep themselves safe and I was taught to respect their decisions on how to
handle the situation safely. What was frustrating about Ms. H was not
even that she would tell us her stories piecemeal or that she would leave
out important facts in order to protect her husband. In all of these respects,
Ms. H’s preferences and responses seemed typical.
What was strange and frustrating to me about Ms. H is best represented
by the following incident. Until this incident occurred, I felt closer to Ms.
H than I did to most other clients with whom I had worked that summer.
The incident began when Ms. H neglected to tell my supervisor and me
key information relevant to her case, her own personal safety, and the
safety of her child. The most significant omission was that she had been
bringing her child to see her husband on a regular basis, violating several
court orders. Ms. H did feel comfortable, however, telling this information
to the Korean interpreter at the courthouse whom she had known for only a
few minutes. Ms. H also told this Korean interpreter every single event in
graphic detail that she had been unwilling or unable to communicate to my
32
Several different courts may issue Orders of Protection. There are criminal Orders of
Protection issued by criminal court and family Orders issued by family courts. A victim may be
provided both types of order or just one order depending on whether criminal charges were filed
against her batterer. The courts generally issue full or partial Orders. A “stay away” Order excludes
the abuser from the home and includes prohibitions from any form of contact. Generally, the Order
includes a specific distance that the abuser must keep from the victim. Phone, email, and all other
contact is barred by the Order as well as third party contact, for example, having a friend or other
person contact the victim on the abuser’s behalf. Courts also issue “refrain from” Orders which do not
exclude the abuser from the home and simply instruct the abuser that he may not menace, harass, or
stalk the victim. NYLAG attorneys almost always attempt to receive a stay away, unless in a particular
situation a stay away Order would make the victim less safe. See KRISTEN KERSCHENSTEINER,
CALLAGHAN’S FAMILY COURT LAW & PRACTICE § 3:11 (2011), available at Westlaw NYFCLP.
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supervisor and me over the course of two months of our representation.
We were in court because the Civil term judge demanded that we
proceed with the divorce case despite the unresolved dockets pending in
family court. The judge had denied our request for a continuance. Instead,
he allowed us a ten minute recess to confer with our client so that she
could consider her options and come to a decision. The clock was ticking
and Ms. H had no choice but to provide the court with an answer or she
risked being held in contempt. Ms. H was not ready to make a decisision
regarding her future. She was crying and the flustered interpreter was
telling us that she could not tell us what Ms. H had spoken to her about
because it was “confidential.” After everything—all the time we had spent
with Ms. H, holding her child, watching over her shoulder to be sure her
husband was not coming towards her, meeting with her over and over
again, being supportive, walking her back and forth to the subway,
spending hours on the phone attempting to get her back into the shelter
system, waking up in the night worrying about her safety—Ms. H did not
trust me or my supervisor because we were not Korean.
After a hurried explanation of the nature of our confidential
relationship with Ms. H, the interpreter finally informed us that Ms. H had
been secretly meeting with her husband and their child. Two days earlier,
they had gone to the zoo together. In fact, a week earlier when we had
been in family court, Mr. and Ms. H had arrived within five minutes of one
another. They were both late and when we had called Ms. H on her cell
phone, she said that a “friend” had driven her. With usual battering cases,
this type of behavior, if discovered by a judge, would simply weaken the
family offense petition and might serve as a means to revoke an Order of
Protection. In Ms. H’s case, it could have been disastrous. If ACS or the
judge or any person associated with or knowledgeable about the case had
seen the family together, Ms. H would have been subject to a neglect
hearing herself and could have risked removal of her son into foster care.
The interpreter also told us that Mr. H told Ms. H that he wanted to
reconcile with her and that their families wanted them to reconcile. His
mother had been calling her—in violation of the Order of Protection’s ban
on third-party contact. Ms. H wanted us to tell the judge that they were
stopping the divorce proceedings.
We tried to make Ms. H understand that we had no power to stop the
divorce proceedings. Mr. H filed the divorce complaint and, therefore,
there was nothing that we could do to stop it. In a very emotional
discussion, one that left me feeling distressed, my supervisor and I had to
tell Ms. H that the only person who could stop her divorce was her
husband. We told her that if he really wanted to reconcile, he could advise
his attorney at any point to withdraw the complaint, but since he had not
done so, it seemed like what he told her must be a lie. We had to tell her
that this was a scheme batterers often use in order to manipulate their
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victims and to weaken both their court claims and their resolve.33
Following this troubling conversation, we returned to the courtroom and
provided the judge with Ms. H’s answer.
The fact that Ms. H is a Korean immigrant influenced almost every
aspect of our work with her.34 Although the above incident represents a
point in time when the cultural divide made our interactions particularly
difficult, even exasperating, this was not the first time that an interpreter
had come between us. When Ms. H left the marital home, where she lived
adjoining Mr. H’s extended family, she went to a shelter run by an Asian
American social services agency. She stayed there for 135 days, the
maximum allowed for a Crisis 1 center.35 We began representing her while
she was still living at the confidential shelter. She was assigned a
caseworker from the social services agency. Her caseworker was not
Korean; she was Japanese. Ms. H had attended university in Japan and had
a degree in Japanese linguistics making communication fairly easy
between them.36 Her caseworker, L, would join her in meetings with us in
order to facilitate translation.37
While I believe that social workers are extremely important partners
for attorneys in working with victims of domestic violence, and can be
tremendous advocates for these women, my supervisor and I found it
33

While writing this Note, I found out that after I left for the summer, Ms. H decided to drop all
of her cases against her husband with the exception of the neglect petition which she had no power to
drop because she was considered the non-respondent mother. She and her husband reconciled as much
as they possibly could while there was still an order of protection associated with the neglect finding
against Mr. H. They had a plan to fully reunite after the order of protection expired, which would have
been in August 2010 at which point they would be free to associate with one another and with their
child unencumbered. Ms. H’s husband dropped the divorce complaint. As of the time of publication, I
have been unable to find out if the family successfully reunited or how Ms. H has fared.
34
I acknowledge that my own culture also influences every aspect of my work and, in turn, how I
approach situations and how I interact with clients and the legal system in general. Leslie Espinoza
Garvey notes that:
I indicate the complicated nature of contextual, cultural, and racial
understanding. The narrative requires that we hold onto the individual story,
with all its unique characteristics, and simultaneously embrace the cultural
context and metamessage of the story. As we lawyer in a way that is always
about our personal, cultural and social history, so too does the client present a
legal situation that is set in a personal context and a cultural reality.
Garvey, supra note 16, at 303.
35
Technically, a woman is allowed to stay only for ninety days in a Crisis 1 shelter, but there is a
forty-five day extension period. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 408.6(b)–(d) (2010).
36
It is unclear why Ms. H was not assigned a Korean caseworker. I have speculated that perhaps
there were fewer Japanese victims at the shelter at that period. While Ms. H was fluent in Japanese,
she still found it more comfortable to communicate in Korean.
37
There are two Korean-speaking attorneys at NYLAG but neither works in the FLU. Agencies
like Safe Horizon make use of phone translation services where necessary, but these are expensive and
inconvenient. Another problem with phone translation services is that they are not subject-specific so it
can be cumbersome to attempt to explain legal terms or domestic violence related services to the
interpreter who then has to understand competently enough to translate to the client, a process which
can be enormously confusing.
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particularly difficult to work with L. The problem we had with L was that
since we could not understand when she spoke to Ms. H in Japanese, it
became impossible to discern whether L was translating properly. Their
exchanges made it seem like L was not only translating, but also advising
Ms. H on how she should answer our questions. My supervisor and I
would ask L to translate a straightforward yes or no question to Ms. H.
After five minutes of back and forth communication, L would say
something like “Ms. H agrees.” Garvey discusses a case where a student
with whom she had worked had a difficult experience communicating with
a Haitian client, which mirrored our interaction with Ms. H and L:
The student explained to the interpreter that he wanted
to have a direct translation. He wanted everything that he
said directly related to the client and then the client’s exact
words back to him. Nevertheless, every time the student
would ask a question, such as, “Do you want to stay in the
apartment?”, he would hear the interpreter and the client
speak back and forth, with great animation, for several
minutes. Then the interpreter would turn to him and say,
“No.” The student attorney did not know what to do. He
felt that he was not understanding the client at all and he
was worried that the client was not getting information
from him.38
In Garvey’s case, the student performed research which led him to
believe that in the Creole pattern of discourse, it was not polite to ask
certain questions directly to the client so that the interpreter felt bound to
“tell a story” in order to respectfully uncover the needed information.39
In our case, I admit that I did not look for cultural reasons as to why
the interpretation was so slow, and why there was so much dialogue that I
was not privy to, when in my mind, I had asked very simple questions. I
came to believe, however, that L was inserting her own opinion while she
was translating. I noticed in court that the Korean interpreters were able
to, by all appearances, translate word for word. If the judge asked a
question, it took the same amount of time for the court interpreter to ask
that question. Likewise, when a Korean-speaking attorney in our office
was available to help us during a meeting with Ms. H, the translation was
smooth and my supervisor and I felt a genuine back and forth dialogue was
taking place between us and our client. My hunch was further confirmed
when my supervisor commented that she had not had the same problem
38
39

Garvey, supra note 16, at 300.
Id.
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with Japanese interpreters in her other cases.
Worse than the fact that our dialogue with our client was frustrating
and slow when we were forced to rely on L to translate for us, it seemed
that the type of responses that we would hear would differ greatly when L
was present and when she was not. My supervisor noted to me that she
encountered this type of situation in the past when working with social
workers from the particular center where L worked, which catered to Asian
American women. She found that, while social workers from other
organizations could empower clients while remaining respectful of their
wishes, social workers from the center where L worked tended to placate
and reinforce the cultural influences which led Ms. H to feel as if she was
disrespecting her family and heritage. L’s approach was passive and
appeared disempowering at the very least.40
My supervisor contrasted our frustration with Ms. H’s case with a
previous case on which she had worked with another client, Ms. M. Ms. M
had a very positive outcome that my supervisor hoped to replicate with Ms.
H. Ms. M was an immigrant from Japan. Unlike Ms. H, she was not a
citizen and was on the path to legal permanent residency based on her
marriage to a U.S. Citizen. When my supervisor first met Ms. M, Ms. M
was skittish, nervous, and afraid. Though she spoke fluent English, she
refused to communicate in English and did not want to say anything about
herself or her case. The entire system frightened her and she was
constantly in fear of being deported by ICE, as she had already
experienced a negative encounter with the agency.41
Ms. M began working with my supervisor and another attorney at
NYLAG. The other attorney is an immigrant from Belgium and has a
striking and powerful presence both in and out of the courtroom. Ms. M
also worked with an immigration lawyer from a Catholic organization who
also was a Japanese immigrant, just like Ms. M. While the litigation was
ongoing, Ms. M worked with a therapist. She was successfully able to
40
Perhaps L is simply not a good social worker. In fact, I am fairly sure this is the case. For
instance, L allowed Ms. H to be discharged from the emergency shelter and to move back in with her
brother in a location known to her batterer. She neglected to secure any type of transitional housing for
Ms. H or to make any attempt to help her obtain shelter housing after we repeatedly insisted that this
was necessary for Ms. H’s safety. I eventually had to try to find shelter space for her myself. It is my
hope to avoid essentialism. I do not mean to hold L out as the archetypal Asian social worker. The
evidence that the center was placating rather than empowering is purely anecdotal.
41
Ms. M’s husband told Immigration & Customs Enforcement (then known as the Immigration &
Naturalization Service) that she had forged an important document that elucidated her work history and
which was integral to her citizenship application. In Japan, it is customary, with permission, to affix
another person’s “seal” to mark the authentication of a document. Ms. M had permission from her boss
in Japan to affix his seal, which signaled that he had “signed” the document. Due to the fact that the
INS believed her husband, the issue had to be litigated in court and with the INS. Ms. M did not want
to involve her boss because in Japan, she said, it is considered shameful to entwine business with one’s
messy personal affairs.
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42

self-petition under VAWA for citizenship.
As she went through this
process and worked with these strong women—two of whom were also
immigrants possessing acumen, drive, and strength—Ms. M began to shift
her response to what was happening to her. She became determined and
empowered by those around her and the path she was beginning to take.
She saw that the system was working to help her. Ultimately, Ms. M
testified against her husband in near perfect English and felt empowered by
the entire experience. She was able to get her green card, get away from
her husband, and move on with her life.
III. INTERSECTIONALITY OF IMMIGRANT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
Both Ms. H and Ms. M’s stories represent the intertwining of different
identities. Both are women, Asian Americans, immigrants, and domestic
violence victims.43 Intersectionality stresses the need to examine the
interactions between these different identities.44 For instance, being Asian
may mean dealing with Asian-specific cultural distinctions and history,
community, stereotypes, and racism. Being a woman may mean dealing
with sexism and having a shared common female identity. Being an
immigrant may bring with it cultural alienation, isolation, worries about
citizenship, language concerns, job concerns, and close-knit immigrant
communities. Being a victim of domestic violence may encompass
feelings of fear, guilt, shame, worries about safety of self and children, and
more. Issues of class and poverty can be pervasive in all of these
categories.
Paulette Caldwell discusses the intersection of race and gender as a
means to combat the oppression of both sexism and racism, specifically
42

See 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2006).
I hope to avoid engaging in essentialism. When I use the words Asian American, it is to denote
cultural “commonalities” as Karin Wang describes them. See Wang, supra note 5, at 161 (“I do not
intend to assert an essential Asian American identity, as there is no singular Asian culture or nation.
‘Asian American’ as an identity is socially constructed and created out of political and social necessity,
in recognition of the need to embrace commonalities among diverse Asian Americans. It is in this vein
that I discuss battered Asian American women. To effectively address barriers faced by Asian
American women but not by battered white women, a recognition of commonalities among Asian
American communities is critical.”).
44
I borrow Kimberle Crenshaw’s apt explanation as a caveat to this section:
43

I should say at the outset that intersectionality is not being offered here as
some new, totalizing theory of identity. Nor do I mean to suggest that violence
against women of color can be explained only through the specific frameworks
of race and gender considered here. Indeed, factors I address only in part or not
at all, such as class or sexuality, are often as critical in shaping the experiences of
women of color. My focus on the intersections of race and gender only
highlights the need to account for multiple grounds of identity when considering
how the social world is constructed.
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244–45 (1991).
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45

focusing on the treatment of African-American women. She discusses
the attempt to eliminate sexism and racism separately as admirable places
to begin the struggle to end both forms of oppression.46 Caldwell boldly
asserts that theoretical analyses which fail to examine the intersectionality
of race and gender, the point where the two meet, are problematic and
incomplete.47 In the experience of many African-American women,
sexism and racism are inextricably linked.48 The existence of the
interactive relationship between race and gender “flows factually and
logically from an examination of the structure of dominance—historically
and contemporarily—and the stereotypes, myths, and images about race
and gender, and in particular black women, that sustain it.” 49 Though the
separation stems from the formation of disparate political movements, it is
ultimately all activists’ failure to recognize intersectionalities that accounts
for our own contributions to oppression.50 “These stereotypes, and the
culture of prejudice that sustains them, exist to define the social position of
black women as subordinate on the basis of gender to all men, regardless
of color, and on the basis of race to all other women.”51 Caldwell demands
that we recognize that racism and sexism can act in concert to disadvantage
African-American women as victims of both forms of oppression, and that
advocates themselves will continue to contribute to oppression until this
intersectionality is acknowledged.52
This logic is illuminating when applied to immigrant domestic
violence victims. Immigrant identity takes into account issues of cultural
isolation, nativism, and xenophobia. Racism and stereotyping can also be
major factors in the immigrant experience depending on the place from
which the immigrant has emigrated. Female domestic violence victims are
physically and emotionally battered by their husbands or boyfriends.
Domestic violence itself is an implicit and debasing form of sexism
45
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991
DUKE L.J. 365, 372–77 (1991).
46
Id. at 373–74.
47
Id.; see also Crenshaw, supra note 44, at 1242 (“In the context of violence against women, this
elision of difference in identity politics is problematic, fundamentally because the violence that many
women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race and class.
Moreover, ignoring difference within groups contributes to tension among groups, another problem of
identity politics that bears on efforts to politicize violence against women. Feminist efforts to politicize
experiences of women and antiracist efforts to politicize experiences of people of color have frequently
proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on mutually exclusive
terrains.”).
48
Caldwell, supra note 45, at 374.
49
Id.
50
See Crenshaw, supra note 44, at 1258 (“Not only do race-based priorities function to obscure
the problem of violence suffered by women of color; feminist concerns often suppress minority
experiences as well.”).
51
Caldwell, supra note 45, at 376.
52
See generally id.
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including notions of domination, oppression, abuse, and categorization.53
Immigration social and legal service agencies and those writing about
immigration difficulties must directly acknowledge these issues and must
pay attention to the ways in which domestic violence can be hidden
amongst other immigration issues that may take precedence in the
immigrant’s presentation.54 Domestic violence advocates, on the other
hand, must be sensitive to the reality that domestic violence outreach
efforts often exclude immigrant victims.
A. The White Woman Paradigm
The anti-domestic violence movement has been criticized for catering
to a white middle class archetype of the domestic violence victim.55 By
recognizing domestic violence exclusively as a gendered issue, white
privilege allows advocates and others to overlook the plethora of critical
issues faced by immigrant victims.
By focusing on gender alone, the anti-domestic violence
movement falls into the same trap as other feminist
53
See Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women: Some
Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 251, 251–52 (2003)
(“Domestic violence occurs on a continuum along with other manifestations of sex discrimination,
including inequality in the workplace, deprivation of reproductive rights, and inadequate access to
welfare, child support, and child care. Every aspect of women’s oppression renders them vulnerable to
violence, and in turn, violence makes women more vulnerable to other forms of disadvantage.”); see
also Anat First & Michal Agmon-Gonnen, Is a Man’s Car More Important than a Battered Woman’s
Body? Human Rights and Punishment for Violent Crimes Against Female Spouses, 12 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 135, 138 (2009) (“We prefer to use the term ‘patriarchal violence’ over the accepted term
‘domestic violence’ because the term ‘patriarchal violence’ is an inherent reminder that violence
occurring in the home is connected to sexism, to sexist thinking, and to male dominance. The term
‘domestic violence’ had served as a ‘soft’ term, for too long, implying that this violence exists in an
intimate context, and therefore is less brutal and threatening.”); see also Crenshaw, supra note 44, at
1241 (“Drawing from the strength of shared experience, women have recognized that the political
demands of millions speak more powerfully than the pleas of a few isolated voices. This politicization
in turn has transformed the way we understand violence against women. For example, battering and
rape, once seen as private (family matters) and aberrational (errant sexual aggression), are now largely
recognized as part of a broad-scale system of domination that affects women as a class.”).
54
See Emira-Habiby Browne, Conference, Issues in Representing Immigrant Victims, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 71, 74 (2001) [hereinafter Issues in Representing Immigrant Victims] (discussing
the difficulties and experiences of the Arab American Family Support Center in recognizing and
appreciating the Arab immigrant experience with domestic violence, “[w]e were not prepared to
address these problems, which had been successfully covered up by the community. We found several
cultural factors, combined with the destabilizing effect of immigration were causing increasing
incidents of domestic violence.”).
55
See, e.g., Wang, supra note 5, at 153 (“Women of color have gained less from the progress of
the anti-domestic violence movement, which has been primarily ‘white-centered.’ And within
communities of color, including Asian American communities, domestic violence has yet to become a
priority issue.”); see also Crenshaw, supra note 44, at 1246 (“Where systems of race, gender, and class
domination converge, as they do in the experiences of battered women of color, intervention strategies
based solely on the experiences of women who do not share the same class or race backgrounds will be
of limited help to women who because of race and class face different obstacles.”).
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movements: it ends up privileging white women. In
American society and laws, gender and race both operate
hierarchically. Men are privileged over women, and white
is privileged over non-white. In a hypothetical world
where gender is the only basis for oppression, the
subordination of women to men might be the only battle
women need to fight. However, in the very real world
where race is also a basis of oppression, where oppressions
are not discrete and insular, and where white is the
privileged race, white women possess an “unearned
advantage” and a “conferred dominance” over non-white
women by virtue of being white. White privilege allows
white women to examine gendered issues such as domestic
violence from a color-blind perspective.56
Immigrant victims face additional challenges that American-born
women do not face. For instance, American-born victims may take for
granted having public service announcements in their own language.
Immigrant victims of color face even further difficulty. Women in
domestic violence awareness campaigns might not look like them or have
similar cultural markers, such as wearing headscarves—that is, if they are
lucky enough to understand the message of the advertisement or have
access to it in the first place.
More importantly, cultural norms regarding gender and violence can
make the victim’s experience a completely unique one from that of a
middle class American-born white woman’s. In fact, it is difficult to
understand how it could be the same. The anti-domestic violence
movement generally bases its outreach on certain underlying assumptions.
For instance, it assumes that domestic violence is wrong and is considered
wrong by family, neighbors, friends, police, and society in general.57
While white American-born women may have concerns about a
bystander’s reluctance to intrude into their personal affairs—as in the Kitty
Genovese case58—they may presume that even those overhearing a violent
incident who would be unwilling to be good Samaritans would at least
believe that what was happening was morally and legally wrong. These
assumptions do not always apply to immigrant victims, or at least, the
victims may not believe that they are true.
56

Wang, supra note 5, at 158.
Id. at 156.
58
Kitty Genovese was murdered in her Queens neighborhood in 1964. Many neighbors
apparently overheard Ms. Genovese’s screams and knew there was an attack taking place, but none did
anything to help her. No one even phoned the police. See Joe Sexton, Reviving Kitty Genovese Case,
and Its Passions, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1995, at B1.
57
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B. The Struggle of Arab-American Women
At the Fifth Annual Domestic Violence Conference held at Fordham
University School of Law, Emira Habiby Browne, Executive Director of
the Arab American Family Support Center (“the Center”)59, spoke about
the experiences of Arab immigrants who are victims of domestic
violence.60 The information Browne shared illustrates the vast differences
between American and immigrant views of domestic violence and
highlights the “cultural factors, combined with the destabilizing effect of
immigration [that] were causing increasing incidents of domestic
violence.”61 It also shows that campaigns may need to be tailored to
recognize the unique problems of each community’s struggle with
domestic violence. Browne noted that the Arab community does not
condemn internal domestic violence due to the fact that Arab immigrants
come from societies that celebrate large patriarchal families in which men
are “kings of their castles.”62 She also discussed how it is considered
shameful for men to have “lost control” of their families.63
Conversely, according to Browne, Arab-American women are
expected to remain in the interior world of the household in the economic
and physical care of their husbands and are not encouraged to think or act
without permission.64 Responsibility for the happiness of both partners
falls on the woman. “Success of the marital relationship is her
responsibility. Failure is viewed by the community as her fault, with
serious social sanctions if she leaves the marital relationship.”65 Further
complicating matters for Arab-American victims is the fact that it is
considered taboo for a woman to divorce or live on her own, so a woman
forced to leave her relationship and home due to domestic violence would
need to have the support of family in order to do so.66 Arab-American
women are expected by their community to stay with their husbands at all
costs. “Women are expected to accept physical, emotional, and verbal
abuse rather than break up the family.”67 When family members believe
59
The Center is “the first and only Arabic-speaking social services agency in the New York City
metropolitan area.” Browne, supra note 54, at 72 n.1. Established in 1994, the Center is a non-profit
organization that provides social services to Arab American immigrant families and children in the
New York City metropolitan area including: “English as a Second Language and literacy classes;
citizenship courses; legal services; afterschool, summer and weekend programs for children; violence
prevention and intervention programs; and access to free and or low-cost health care.” ARAB
AMERICAN FAMILY SUPPORT CENTER, http://www.aafscny.org/aboutus/our-mission-history (last
visited Oct. 6, 2011).
60
Browne, supra note 54.
61
Id. at 74.
62
Id. at 74–75.
63
Id. at 75.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Browne, supra note 54, at 75.
67
Id. at 75–76.
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that domestic violence is the victim’s fault, it seems unlikely that they will
support her or allow her to live with them after she leaves her batterer.
Browne also discussed the difficulty the Center has had in placing
victims in the shelter system. Many of these women have never lived apart
from their family or their husbands. She noted that the Center “[has] never
been successful in sending [victims] to shelters.”68 Almost all of the
women that she has worked with at the Center eventually returned to their
abusers, where they often faced further abuse in retaliation for their initial
departure from the home.69 Part of this retaliation is also due to the fact
that the Arab community places enormous pressure on families to maintain
reputation and standing, which is jeopardized when a woman leaves the
home.70
Browne explained how “family problems are not to be discussed or
publicly displayed.”71 The males in the family are ultimately held
responsible for the family’s reputation and honor and must maintain it.
“Family violence, therefore, cannot be openly acknowledged and must be
outwardly denied, eliminating the possibility of addressing it openly and
honestly.”72
C. The Latina Experience
The Latina immigrant experience with domestic violence provides yet
another divergent cultural context that differs from the dominant view of
domestic violence. Jenny Rivera discusses the idea that the ideal Latina is
a wife and mother, subservient to the patriarchal society around her, and
bound by the traditional gender roles placed upon her.73
For Latinas, cultural norms and myths of national origin
intersect with these patriarchal notions of a woman’s role
and identity. The result is an internal community-defined
role, modified by external male-centered paradigms. This
68

Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 74–76
71
Id. at 77.
72
Id.
73
Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race,
National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 241 (1994) (“Those within
the Latino community expect Latinas to be traditional, and to exist solely within the Latino family
structure. A Latina must serve as a daughter, a wife, and a parent, and must prioritize the needs of
family members above her own. She is the foundation of the family unit. She is treasured as a selfsacrificing woman who will always look to the needs of others before her own. The influence of
Catholicism throughout Latin America solidifies this image within the community, where Latinas are
expected to follow dogma and to be religious, conservative, and traditional in their beliefs.”); see also
Wood, supra note 9, at 151 (“Exacerbating these difficulties is an unwillingness to violate strong
cultural norms of what a wife and mother should be, which represent another barrier to seeking help.”).
69
70
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intersection of gender, national origin, and race denies
Latinas a self-definitional, experiential-based, feminist
portrait.74
Rivera contends that the anti-domestic violence movement and the
system have failed when services cannot effectively help Latinas because
of cultural and language barriers.75
Rivera differentiates Latina immigrants from other immigrants by the
fact that Latina immigrants are much less likely to contact others including
friends, clergy, or other social service providers before entering the shelter
system.76 Since they are more likely to marry at a younger age, have large
families, be poorer and less educated, and stay in relationships for a longer
period of time, correspondingly, Latina victims suffer more extensive
periods of abuse than other victims.77 Rivera notes that movements within
the Latino community have focused on the struggle for equality, ignoring
domestic violence issues because these are regarded as “private.”78 She
also notes that there is a backlash in the community against raising
awareness of domestic violence perpetrated by Latino males, because the
community feels strongly that Latino males are characterized as “violent”
and “macho” by whites and others. Rivera suggests that these stereotypes
regarding Latino men are embraced within the community, despite
activists’ attempts to dismantle them.79 Though the goal of reducing
stereotypes associated with the Latino community generally is laudable,
Rivera argues that it must not be at the expense of Latina identity and
victimization.80
D. Asian American Victims
The Asian immigrant context is yet another example where culture
serves as a differentiating factor for domestic violence victims. Ms. H’s
case represents my own experience working with an Asian immigrant
client and my experience, as outlined above, highlights the cultural
differences between us which made representation very difficult. In our
74

Rivera, supra note 73, at 241.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 232, 252. Rivera provides an anecdote that illustrates her explanation of a reason why
Latinas may resist help-seeking behavior. Id. at 231 (“After about two months he started . . . hitting
me again. This time I was going to do something, so I told Yolanda, my best friend. She said, and
I’ll never forget it, ‘So what, you think my boyfriend doesn’t hit me? That’s how men are.’ It was
like I was wrong or weak because I wanted to do something about it. Last time he got mad he
threatened me with a knife. That really scared me.”).
77
Id. at 252.
78
Id. at 255.
79
Id. at 240–41, 251, 255.
80
Rivera, supra note 73, at 255.
75
76
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case, Ms. H gave my supervisor and me some context for her experiences.
She told us that in Korea, domestic violence is not only commonplace, but
is an accepted way of life, albeit a secret one. She described to us how in
the early morning hours, there are lines of victims waiting outside the
hospitals. The women receive medical treatment and are sent directly
home to their abusers. The police do not wish to be involved and would
turn away a victim requesting assistance, because even mentioning the
occurrence of domestic violence is shameful.
Karin Wang’s discussion of Asian American victims of domestic
violence correlates with Ms. H’s narrative of life in Korea.81 Wang notes
that there are important commonalities across Asian cultures. Asian
women may be distinguished from white women due to “the
overwhelmingly immigrant character of Asian American communities . . .
the existence of similar cultural patterns across most Asian American
communities, and . . . the existence of harmful stereotypes about Asian
Americans collectively and Asian American women specifically.”82 Wang
explains that the idea of “keeping face” is evident in the sense that
protecting the family honor is paramount to individual identity and
concerns.83 She provides the following wrenching, yet illustrative
narrative from a news article to begin her discussion of Asian family and
gender roles:
“I didn’t sense the danger because I was so focused on the
shame my daughter’s actions would bring in the
Cambodian community. And I was thinking about my
daughter’s children and the importance of their having a
family.” Kim Leang is remembering her daughter Kim
Seng, killed by her abusive husband, Sartout Nom. A
week before Kim Seng’s murder, Kim Leang had
organized a family meeting, where both sides of the family
urged the young couple to stay together and asked Nom to
stop beating Kim Seng. Says Kim Leang, “Sometimes
because we value our cultural traditions, we try to get
families reunited at whatever cost.”84
This description of the Leang family’s reaction to the battering of their
daughter and the Seng family’s reaction to their son battering his wife
matches the character of Ms. H’s situation exactly. Wang argues that this
81

See Wang, supra note 5, at 169–70.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 169.
84
Id. at 168 (quoting Geeta Anand, Mother’s Regret Raises Abuse Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, May 8,
1994, at 29).
82
83
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behavior is representative of the strong emphasis on sacrificing for one’s
family as part of a group identity that is characteristic of Asian cultures.85
To the extent that individual identity is present at all, male identity is
prized over female identity.86
Asian women in the traditional family structure are expected to “be
dependent, to suffer, and to persevere.”87 The strong group identity and
push to sacrifice for one’s family deter women from choosing to leave their
husbands or getting a divorce.88 If they do attempt to leave home, they
face shelters that are generally ill-equipped to handle the language and
cultural concerns of Asian American victims.89
Win Ha first sought help last year after her husband beat
her three times during her first month in the U.S. A
Vietnamese friend gave her the number of an advocacy
group, and Ha was placed in a mainstream women’s
shelter. But she stayed only three days. “There was no
Vietnamese food in the shelter,” says Ha, and no one
spoke Vietnamese, so when Ha’s children became sick,
she didn’t know what to do.90
These issues together serve to reinforce fears about the outside world
that may prevent victims from leaving home. Issues with shelter,
language, and food, for instance, cause victims to return to their abusers
even if they were able to leave initially.
These are simply several examples of instances where an immigrant’s
culture intersects with her gender and her identity as a victim of domestic
violence. There are many different ethnic and cultural experiences that are
not represented above and which may be extremely different from the
preceding examples. Lawyers and others who work to help domestic
violence victims must take cultural identity into account because each
woman’s story is unique, and every case bears the imprint of the victim’s
cultural and personal experiences. Only through our understanding of her
culture can the victim’s story become accessible and, in turn, our help
become meaningful.

85

Id. at 169.
Id.
87
Wang, supra note 5, at 169.
88
Id. at 170.
89
See id. at 157.
90
Id. (quoting Battered Asian Immigrant Women Find Help at Shelter (NPR Radio Broadcast,
July 24, 1994), available at LEXIS, Transcript No. 1081–13).
86
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IV. SOLUTIONS
As we engage in the struggle to end the subordination of immigrant
victims of domestic violence, we must recognize and promote awareness
of their intersectional identities. Solutions to both “internal” and
“external” problems for these victims must take intersectionality into
account.91 Similarly, in recognizing and dealing with this intersectionality,
the only way that we can possibly appreciate and successfully approach all
aspects of the immigrant victim’s struggle is by coming together in a
coalition.92 Mari Matsuda’s idea of coalition provides a framework for the
type of action that must be taken in order to begin peeling back the layers
of subordination, subordination that is based on gender, on national origin,
on language ability, and on race.93
A. Coalition
Matsuda presents a revolutionary theory which proposes to end
subordination through the formation of a coalition.94 Coalition means an
acknowledgment of our own biases and cultural influences, but it also
encompasses the realization that we can only end our own subordination
by ending all subordination. Coalition also means reaching out across all
areas of subordination in order to recognize the parallels in our struggles,
and to struggle together in an attempt to overcome what we cannot easily
overcome alone. “This is the revolutionary theory of law that we are
developing in coalition, and I submit that it is both a theory of law we can
only develop in coalition, and that it is the only theory of law we can
develop in coalition.”95
If we fail to recognize intersectionality and if we cannot come together
from our own places of subordination, whether it is as feminists, as civil
rights advocates, or as immigrant advocates, we will have failed our clients
because we will not understand who they are and what they face. As
individuals working in the domestic violence context, we must reach out to
immigrant advocates to understand the immigration laws as they relate to
domestic violence. We must reach out to social workers, activists, and
advocates through coalition-building. We must be involved in the struggle
91
See id. at 184 (“It is important to push both the battered women’s movement and the Asian
American community towards an intersectional framework because battered Asian American women
face certain unique obstacles which are rooted in both their gender and race. These obstacles must be
addressed together, not in discrete and insular packages of race as separate from gender. Only within
such an intersectional paradigm can the unique needs and concerns of Asian American women be
adequately addressed.”).
92
There are very subtle, yet key differences between the idea of coalition and the idea of
coalition-building. For an outline of the distinctions, see supra Part I.
93
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 1188.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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against subordination in all forms, rather than simply completing our small
piece of the puzzle and patting ourselves on the back. While our job is to
zealously advocate for our clients in the courtroom and beyond, it is also
part of our charge to engage in active lawyering and to work towards
ending subordination through coalition.
B. Cross-Cultural Lawyering
After we recognize our own role in the struggle, our own subordination
of others, and the subordination we each face, we must take practical steps
to alleviate that subordination. We must be culturally competent and we
must engage in cross-cultural lawyering. Leslie Espinoza Garvey asserts:
“I believe that lawyering can be conducted in a way that creates space for
understanding outsider perspectives.”96 I believe that we must create this
space.
The stories we hear from our clients indicate two
things. First, these stories demonstrate the power of
narrative to yield contextual, cultural, and racial
understanding. Second, they indicate the complicated
nature of contextual, cultural, and racial understanding.
The narrative requires that we hold onto the individual
story, with all its unique characteristics, and
simultaneously embrace the cultural context and
metamessage of the story. As we lawyer in a way that is
always about our personal, cultural and social history, so
too does the client present a legal situation that is set in a
personal context and a cultural reality.97
We must be trained in how to recognize our own implicit biases and
their relationship to the complicated histories and contexts of our clients.
We must acquire and use that knowledge to be effective advocates.
Cultural competence training requires us to conduct “a deliberate
exploration of the deeply rooted cultural assumptions that claim us” and to
face “discomforting truths about ourselves and our society.”98
Though it might be uncomfortable to do so, by recognizing and
appreciating differences in culture between ourselves and our clients, we
can begin the process of understanding. Marjorie Silver notes that “[i]n the
broad use of the term, all lawyering is cross-cultural, yet few lawyers

96

Garvey, supra note 16, at 298.
Id. at 303.
98
Silver, supra note 16, at 230.
97
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perceive it as such.” What in fact makes a lawyer culturally competent is
the recognition that we must act as cross-cultural lawyers, that we already
engage in cross-cultural lawyering, whether successfully or not, and the
subsequent realization that we require education in the art of doing so.100 It
is also a recognition of our limitations, which calls for further learning, or
simply the realization that certain cultural ideas or racial understandings
are beyond our ability to grasp. In my situation with Ms. H, I cannot think
of anything that I could have done differently that would have made her
feel comfortable. That feeling remains troubling to me.
C. Ethnic Matching
Shani King proposes a theory of ethnic matching101 in the attorneyclient relationship, which I believe is a practical way of bridging the gap
between attorney and client. There is a point at which the attorney-client
relationship hits a wall due to a lack of identification or understanding,
ultimately interfering with the client’s representation. The idea is that, if
you have an African-American attorney at your legal services organization,
then you should place African-American clients with that attorney.
Similarly, if we had a Korean attorney in the FLU, we would have had the
Korean attorney represent Ms. H. King describes the African-American
experience with the legal system and the increased comfort level that
African-American clients have with African-American attorneys, including
the sharing of a group identity, increased trust, better communication
between attorney and client, and a shared perception and recognition of a
racist judicial system.102 She stresses that cultural competency trainers can
only do so much and that despite the training an attorney has received, she
will never be able to live the experience of being African-American
without being born African-American.103
The idea of ethnic matching is intrinsically disturbing, but I believe
that King is correct when she stresses the need for us to let go of these
feelings of discomfort and to realize the practical benefits of such a
system.104 “[W]e cannot afford for race-consciousness to be seen as an
99

Id.
See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 55 (2001) (“Thus, a competent cross-cultural lawyer acknowledges racism,
power, privilege and stereotyped thinking as influencing her interactions with clients and case planning,
and works to lessen the effect of these pernicious influences.”).
101
King, supra note 15, at 4–5 (proposing that matching clients with an attorney of their race
would allow legal services organizations to better serve clients by helping to build trust and providing
more effective communication between client and attorney).
102
Id. at 1.
103
Id. at 6.
104
The suggestion of intentional segregation by race is troubling to me based on its shameful
place in United States history. My uneasiness is also due to the reminder that our society, even in
2011, has not progressed to the point where race is no longer a barrier between people.
100
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arbitrary, irrational evil, irrespective of who is taking race into
consideration and regardless of the context in which it is being used.”105
The idea is particularly helpful with immigrants because, even if you
discount King’s arguments regarding the cultural differences between
African-Americans and whites—which I do not—you could still make the
argument that whites and African-Americans share the culture of being
born American, which provides at least some basis of understanding. With
immigrants, there may be next to nothing shared culturally between
attorney and client.
The problems with ethnic matching, like its benefits, are of a practical
nature. One problem with instituting ethnic matching is that legal services
firms are understaffed and underfunded. In cities like New York, it would
be impossible for a small legal services firm like NYLAG to hire an
attorney of every ethnicity, if one could even fathom every ethnicity. New
York is one of the most culturally diverse cities in the world. Every single
client with whom I interacted this summer was ethnically different from
every other. Our department had seven attorneys. While NYLAG is
incredibly diverse overall, it would be impossible for us to hand off a
domestic violence case to an attorney in the Housing department just
because she is Korean.106 Another problem with ethnic matching is one
that King herself notes; legal services organizations could run into trouble
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act based on hiring certain races.107
King’s interpretation of Grutter v. Bollinger108 ultimately leads her to
believe that racially motivated hiring under a “diversity rationale” would
steer legal services agencies into the clear.109 I believe that ethnic
matching should be encouraged where possible, but cannot solve the
problems described above because it is impractical in the world of public
interest lawyering.
D. Domestic Violence-Specific Outreach to Immigrant Communities
Solutions must entail breaking down the subordination and barriers
that prevent immigrant victims from accessing legal services to begin with,
no matter what the race or culture of their attorney is likely to be. This
must be done by increasing immigrant victims’ awareness of the services
that are available to help them. It is part of our duty, expanding our role as
105

King, supra note 15, at 19.
There was a Korean attorney working in the Housing department during my time working on
Ms. H’s case. On two occasions, she was able to translate for us, which was enormously helpful.
Having both a native speaker and an attorney as interpreter was immeasurably helpful. I could only
notice, however, how much easier and more comfortable it would have been for Ms. H if a Korean
attorney could have represented her.
107
King, supra note 15, at 47.
108
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
109
King, supra note 15, at 48.
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part of a coalition. Marry Ann Dutton, Leslye Orloff, and Giselle Aguilar
Hass surveyed Latina victims in Washington D.C. for Ayuda.110 They
found that “educational campaigns about domestic violence and the relief
available to help battered women escape, avoid, resist, or stop the violence
aimed at women in immigrant communities may be the best route to reach
battered immigrant women.”111 The authors note that the campaigns
should also be aimed at those who might be in the support network of a
victim in order to expand the reach of the message and to avoid women
thinking “well that isn’t happening to me.”112
These educational and public service campaigns must be ubiquitous
and they must be multi-lingual and multicultural. “Additional funding for
linguistically-compatible and culturally-sensitive shelters is a wasted
expenditure if battered women fail to realize that the resources are
available.”113 Women must see women in the advertisements that look like
them and that speak their language. The public service messages must be
clearly understandable and must be broadcast on foreign language radio
stations and television stations where possible. Some have even suggested
that ICE should bear the financial and distribution responsibilities of
providing pamphlets to immigrant women when they enter the country.114
This solution, while promising, would not reach undocumented immigrants
who make up a large portion of battered immigrant victims.115
E. Positive Outcome Outreach
Dutton and her colleagues’ survey results also indicated that grassroots
involvement by victims who have had success with the legal system could
enable other victims to engage in help-seeking behavior in order for more
110
Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service
Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 245, 256 (2000). Ayuda is a community organization which protects the rights of low-income
immigrants in the District of Columbia metropolitan area specifically with immigration and family law
issues. “We are the region’s leading provider of multilingual legal and social services for low-income
immigrants in the areas of immigration, human trafficking, domestic violence and sexual assault.”
AYUDA, http://www.ayudainc.org/template/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
111
Dutton et al., supra note 110, at 282.
112
See id. at 282–83.
113
Franco, supra note 8, at 134.
114
See id. (“On the bureaucratic level, [ICE, formerly] INS should be required to distribute
pamphlets that provide information about immigrant women’s legal rights. A special emphasis should
be placed on reaching battered immigrant women.”); see also Loke, supra note 4, at 622–23 (“[ICE,
formerly] INS should be required to distribute information about domestic violence and its impact on
immigrant women. The law presently requires [ICE] to inform conditional residents of the joint
petition requirements to adjust to permanent residency. Information about domestic violence could
easily be distributed at the same time. Immigrant women should be made aware that laws are different
in the United States. They can then make informed choices about their safety and the relative risks of
behavior.”).
115
See Dutton et al., supra note 110, at 263, tbl. 2 (noting that 44.7% of survey respondents
reporting abuse were undocumented immigrants).
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successful outcomes. I think that this type of victim-survivor interaction
is enormously helpful and must be encouraged at the grassroots advocacy
level, extending to the legal interactions between attorney and client. I call
this type of interaction “positive outcome outreach” where a survivor can
coach a victim. In Ms. H’s case, both my supervisor and I felt that positive
outcome outreach with another client of a similar background, like Ms. M,
who became empowered by her interactions with the legal system, would
have been extremely helpful for Ms. H in her struggle.
F. Solutions in Concert
Ms. H would have benefitted both directly and indirectly from each of
the solutions mentioned above. Ethnic matching, if feasible, would have
eliminated a number of the problems that my supervisor and I encountered
in attempting to effectively represent her. It would have made her more
comfortable and able to share the information necessary to build her case
and to keep her safe. Attempting to recognize intersectionalities, to lawyer
cross-culturally, and to achieve cultural competence is an ongoing
process—one that we must strive to improve upon every day. We must
strive to recognize our own contributions to our client’s subordination and
also the ways in which we ourselves are subordinated.
V. CONCLUSION
Victims of domestic violence face daunting odds in attempting to seek
help. They risk their safety and the safety of their children and may lose
their entire way of life. They venture into the world often with no way to
support themselves and no one on whom they can rely for help. Immigrant
victims not only face these same problems, but they often do not speak the
majority language, do not understand the legal system, and have no idea
where to go for assistance. In fact, they may believe there is no one who
will help them. Many immigrant victims have no documentation at all, but
even those who possess some sort of conditional residency or U.S.
citizenship may fear deportation, or that their husbands will report them to
ICE or will rescind sponsorship of citizenship.
Many immigrants are so isolated that the only voice they hear is that of
their abuser. They may not be aware that domestic violence is illegal in
the United States or that the police may be willing and able to help them.
They may justifiably fear that their husband’s superior English language
skills will mean that police will listen to him and not to them. They may
fear losing their children due to their undocumented status or might believe
that, like in the country from which they emigrated, fathers always retain
116

See id. at 284–85.
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custodial rights to children. Even if they are able to leave, immigrant
victims may have no idea that there are resources available to them, if there
are resources that will be able to fully accommodate them. For instance,
there may be social service agencies and shelters that speak their language,
know their culture, and provide sensitive services with both in mind, but
these services are not available for every ethnic background and may be
less available in suburban or rural areas.
If immigrant victims are able to access social and legal services, there
still may be gaps in culture and understanding that prevent open lines of
communication. Immigrant identity thus may act as a barrier to effective
legal counseling. Interpreters often are required which can interfere with
the development of a trusting relationship between attorney and client.
Cultural cues, customs, and social norms can be vastly different between
attorney and client. The client may feel more comfortable confiding in her
interpreter than in her attorney and may feel a strain when trying to discuss
what tend to be emotional, conflicting, painful, and trying issues with an
attorney who figuratively and literally does not speak her language.
In order to alter the system in which we currently practice, we must
recognize two important ideas. First, we must account for and appreciate
the intersectionality of gender, culture, language, and other barriers that
affect our clients. With immigrant clients, we must understand their pain
as much as possible through the lens of their cultural experience, and not
our own. We must attempt to facilitate an open exchange that extends
beyond language barriers.
If these movements that seem to hold such promise of
transforming law into a healing profession are to make a
meaningful difference in the status quo, we who support
them must self-consciously reach out across racial divides.
We must both figure out why we have so far not succeeded
in doing so, and how to overcome this failing. And we
must be open to the possibility that the contributions of
lawyers, psychologists, social workers, and clients from a
multiplicity of racial groups may transform our
understanding of what it means to practice law as a
profession of healing. We must be open to the possibility
that by embracing diverse perspectives, our very notion of
transformation may be altered.117
The only way to accomplish these goals, to transform our profession
and our practice, is by engaging in coalition. We must build a coalition of
117

Silver, supra note 16, at 237.
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social workers, social services agencies, and governmental agencies, where
safe to do so. We can deconstruct barriers between us by communicating,
having meetings and organizing. We must also engage in coalition by
recognizing our own contributions to subordination generally, and being
aware of our cultural predispositions and assumptions.
As Mari Matsuda explains, we must create and participate in an active
theory of the law, a “revolutionary” theory of law “taking sides.”118 We
must step outside our limited legal universe, to forge partnerships, to
attempt to understand where we go wrong, and to learn what others can
teach us to help us get it right. “When we work in coalition . . . we
compare our struggles and challenge one another’s assumptions. We learn
of the gaps and absences in our knowledge. We learn a few tentative,
starting truths, the building blocks of a theory of subordination.”119 We
must find the means to end this subordination. Immigrant identity may be
a barrier to effective legal counseling, but an active theory of law can break
down this barrier brick by brick.
I propose that as attorneys and law students representing immigrant
domestic violence victims, we must strive to be culturally competent, we
must be aware of our status as cross-cultural lawyers, and we must
embrace that role. We must encourage multi-lingual ethnically conscious
education and public service messages that reach every community, in
languages that are understandable, and in cultural contexts that provide
victims with the means to self-identify. We must encourage positive
outcome outreach by pairing victims with survivors to lessen fear, to guide
victims through the process in a way that may be unavailable to them
through their attorney or social workers, and to show them that the legal
process can actually empower them. “Through our sometimes painful
work in coalition we are beginning to form a theory of subordination; a
theory that describes it, explains it, and gives us the tools to end it.”120

118
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 1188 (“As lawyers working in coalition, we are developing a theory
of law taking sides, rather than law as value-neutral.”).
119
Id.
120
Id.

A Look at In re Fabian A.: Examining the Extension
of Due Process Protections and Failure to Object as
Waiver in the Juvenile Justice System
ELIZABETH BANNON†
I. INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt as to the importance of the protection provided by
due process to defendants in the American judicial system. It is of
particular importance, however, where it applies to the notion of informed
consent, specifically as it pertains to plea canvasses and whether a guilty
plea has been entered into “knowingly and voluntarily.”1
Recently, the Supreme Court of Connecticut established a rule
requiring that the due process protection of informed consent be extended
to plea canvasses in the juvenile process. This decision is in line with the
national movement towards recognizing that, while the adult and juvenile
justice systems must be different in order to reflect the inherent differences
between adult and juvenile offenders, certain due process protections must
apply to both systems.2
Shortly after the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in In re Jason
C.,3 another issue arose with regards to informed consent—namely, to what
extent must the court inform a juvenile defendant during a plea canvass4 of
circumstances surrounding his commitment and sentence in order to ensure
that the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily? As seen in the case of In
re Fabian A.,5 the failure of the court in In re Jason C. to establish a
specific standard of the extent of information provided during a plea
†
J.D. candidate, May 2012, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. Boston University. A
special thanks to my friends and family who offered support and who were always willing to lend an
ear during the writing of this Note.
1
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 466 (1969) which establishes, at a federal level, that “if a guilt[y] plea is not equally
voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void”); State v.
Godek, 438 A.2d 114 (Conn. 1980) (establishing the “knowing and voluntary” requirement at a state
level).
2
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (applying criminal standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to juvenile proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 57 (1967) (applying
requirements for adequate notice of hearing and confrontation of witnesses to juvenile adjudicatory
proceedings).
3
See In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710 (Conn. 2001).
4
A plea canvass is a pre-trial proceeding during which time a trial court judge informs the
defendant of his charges and conditions surrounding the entry of a guilty or nolo contendere plea, at
which point the defendant either enters a plea or proceeds to trial. See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 30a-4
(2011).
5
See In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
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canvass resulted in the Appellate Court’s finding that the plea had not been
made knowingly or voluntarily because the court failed to adequately
inform Fabian A. of circumstances under which his commitment might be
extended.
While the notions of due process and informed consent are relevant,
what is most surprising and troublesome about the case of In re Fabian A.
is the defense counsel’s failure to raise the issue of informed consent
during the juvenile’s initial plea canvass. As seen with due process
generally, the adult and juvenile justice systems seem to be growing more
and more similar. Does that—should that—mean that what would
constitute a failure to preserve a claim (by failing to object during the plea
canvass) in the adult system also amount to failure to preserve a claim in
the juvenile system?
This Note will argue is that while it is important to extend the
protection of due process to the juvenile justice system, it is of equal
importance to preserve the flexibility and rehabilitative focus that for so
long has differentiated the juvenile system from the adult. The general
rule, which is to accept a failure to object as waiver of the right to pursue a
claim at a later date, may be fair and appropriate in an adult criminal
system. 6 However, extending such rigid restrictions to the juvenile system
ultimately undermines its very purpose – to hold juveniles accountable for
their unlawful behavior while at the same time protecting their best
interest.
II. BACKGROUND: IN RE JASON C. AND IN RE FABIAN A.
A. In re Jason C.: Establishing “Knowing and Voluntary” in the Juvenile
System
The development of the “knowing and voluntary” requirement during
plea canvasses in the juvenile justice system in Connecticut began with the
case of In re Jason C.7 This case involved the commitment of two separate
minors, Jason C. and Greily L., to the Department of Children and Families
(“DCF”). Both juveniles pleaded nolo contendere to various charges
brought against them and were committed to DCF during separate plea
canvasses. To understand the application of the due process requirement
of “knowing and voluntary” to the admission of a guilty plea, or in the
cases of Jason C. and Greily L., a plea of nolo contendere, it is important to
know the facts and history of each case.

6
7

See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121h (2011).
See In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 719.
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1. In re Jason C.: The Facts
In August or September of 1996, Jason C., a sixteen-year-old male,
“allegedly committed an act likely to impair the health and morals of a
child under the age of sixteen in violation” of Connecticut law.8 On
February 10, 1997, the Superior Court adjudicated Jason C. a delinquent,
following a plea of nolo contendere to the charge, and Jason C.
subsequently was committed to DCF “for a period not to exceed eighteen
months.”9 In March of 1997, prior to his commitment, Jason C. allegedly
engaged in sexual conduct with a four-year-old child, once again violating
the law of the State of Connecticut.10 On October 30, 1997, Jason C. once
again appeared before the trial court in a plea canvass, this time for the
adjudication of the charge of sexual assault in the fourth degree.11 He once
again pleaded nolo contendere.12 Pursuant to the two plea agreements, the
court committed Jason C. to DCF for eighteen months, effective October
31, 1997. Subsequently, Jason C.’s commitment was extended by
agreement between DCF and the court until October 30, 1999 – well
beyond the original eighteen-month commitment period as originally
agreed upon during the October 30, 1997 plea canvass. 13 On October 1,
1999, DCF again filed a petition, this time seeking to extend Jason C.’s
commitment for an additional twelve months. It is important to note that at
no time during either plea canvass, or after DCF filed its second petition
for extension of commitment, did the trial court advise Jason C. of the
possibility that DCF could petition for an extension of his commitment.14
The second juvenile defendant in In re Jason C. was Greily L., a
seventeen-year-old female. On April 6, 1998, the Superior Court
adjudicated Greily L. a delinquent following a plea of nolo contendere to
the charge of violating a court order.15 The Court committed Greily L. to
DCF for a period not to exceed eighteen months. However, as it did during
Jason C.’s plea canvasses, the Court failed to inform Greily L. of the
possibility that DCF could petition for an extension of her commitment,

8

Id. at 712.
Id. Under Connecticut law, “commitment of children convicted as delinquent by the Superior
Court to the Department of Children and Families shall be for (1) an indeterminate time up to a
maximum of eighteen months. . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141 (2011).
10
In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 712.
11
Id. at 712–13.
12
Id. at 13.
13
Id. Pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141 (2011), “[t]he Commissioner of Children and
Families may file a motion for an extension of the commitment…(a) beyond the eighteen-month period
on the grounds that such extension is for the best interest of the child or the community. The court
shall give notice to the parent or guardian and to the child at least fourteen days prior to the hearing
upon such motion.”
14
In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 713.
15
Id.
9
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which DCF did on September 23, 1999.
On November 22, 1999 and December 3, 1999, both Jason C. and
Greily L., respectively, filed motions to dismiss the extension petitions,
claiming in relevant part that “granting the petition to extend commitment
would violate the plea agreement,” that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-141 was
“void for vagueness,” and that “granting the petition for extension of
commitment would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.”17 The
trial court granted each motion to dismiss on the grounds that “[f]ailure to
advise the respondents of a possible extension of delinquency commitment
prevented them from entering a knowing and voluntary plea, thereby
rendering the plea invalid.”18
2. The Effect of In re Jason C. on the Juvenile Justice Process
The court in In re Jason C., by granting the defendants’ motions to
dismiss, established a precedent in the Connecticut juvenile justice system
that “when accepting a plea agreement, due process requires a court to
advise a juvenile of possible extensions to the delinquency commitment.”19
Because neither defendant had been advised of the possibility that DCF
could petition for an extension of commitment—an action that would bring
their confinement beyond the eighteen month maximum as established by
Connecticut law, the maximum time they believed they could be
committed—they did not have “all the relevant information required by . . .
long-standing and well settled [Connecticut] law.”20 Therefore, the Court
concluded that “their pleas were not knowing and voluntary,” and thus
were invalid.21 As a result of In re Jason C., trial courts are now “required
to advise a juvenile of the possibility that his or her delinquency
commitment may be extended beyond the period of time stated in the plea
agreement.”22
The new standard for acceptance of a juvenile defendant’s guilty plea
during a plea colloquy mirrors the standard that has been well-established
in the adult justice system in Connecticut, both in statute and at common
law.23 In essence, what the court in In re Jason C. did was extend the due
16

Id.

17

Id. DCF’s petition sought to extend Greily L.’s commitment for an additional eighteen months.

Id.
Id. at 713–14 (emphasis added).
19
Id. at 714.
20
In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710, 716 (Conn. 2001); see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141 (2011).
21
In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 716.
22
Id. at 714. This rule has since been codified into Connecticut law: “To assure that any plea or
admission is voluntary and knowingly made, the judicial authority shall address the child or youth in
age appropriate language to determine that the child or youth substantially understands . . . [t]he
possible penalty, including any extensions or modifications.” CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 30a-4 (2011).
23
See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 39-19 & 39-20 (requiring that the “judicial authority . . . not
accept the [guilty] plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that he or she
18
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process protection of informed consent required in the adult justice system
to the juvenile justice system. In doing so, it acknowledged the Supreme
Court’s precedent that there are inherent differences between juveniles and
adults, which require a difference in the law’s treatment of each.24
However, the court also acknowledged that courts must take special
caution to balance state objectives in the juvenile justice system against
notions of fundamental fairness.25 Thus, “[b]ecause of the seriousness
involved in the institutionalization of a juvenile, and the lack of a negative
effect on juvenile proceedings,” the court concluded that “a juvenile is
entitled to be advised of the possibility of commitment extensions when
making a plea. The status of being a juvenile does not warrant
abandonment of the well established rule that a defendant be advised of the
direct consequences of his plea.”26
B. “Knowing and Voluntary” Meets Waiver: In re Fabian A.
The court in In re Jason C. made great strides towards extending due
process protections inherent in the adult criminal justice system to the
juvenile system in Connecticut. It laid out that basic rule that trial courts,
before accepting a juvenile’s guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, must
ensure that the juvenile is aware of the possibility of extension of his or her
commitment and that the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily.
However, the court failed to specifically enumerate the extent to which the
court must advise the defendant so as to ensure that his or her plea is made
knowingly and voluntarily. This issue arose in the context of In re Fabian
A.
1. Background and Facts
On August 25, 2005, Fabian A., a fifteen-year-old male, pleaded guilty
to charges of disorderly conduct and violation of probation.27 The trial
court adjudicated him delinquent and committed him to the custody of
DCF for a period not to exceed eighteen months.28 At the outset of the
fully understands: (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered; (2) The mandatory
minimum sentence, if any; . . . [and] (4) The maximum possible sentence on the charge. . . .”); CONN.
SUPER. CT. R. § 39-20 (ensuring that the defendant’s plea is “voluntary and is not the result of force or
threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement”). See also State v. Hall, 992 A.2d 343, 345 (Conn.
App. 2010), cert. granted in part, 995 A.2d 638 (Conn. 2010) (finding that, by failing “to address [the
defendant] personally or to determine that he understood that his immigration status might be adversely
affected by his guilty pleas[,]” the court failed to substantially comply with Connecticut statute).
24
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (acknowledging the necessity to maintain
“informality and flexibility” in the juvenile setting).
25
In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 718 (looking at In re Steven G., 556 A.2d 131 (Conn. App. Ct.
1989).
26
Id.
27
In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411, 413 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
28
Id.
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plea canvass, the presiding Judge Wollenberg, advised Fabian A. that he
could ask a question at any time.29 Judge Wollenberg proceeded to ask
him various questions, pursuant to the rule set forth by In re Jason C., in
order to establish that Fabian A.’s plea was made knowingly and
voluntarily.30 After accepting his plea, the court turned to the order of
commitment. Upon learning from the probation officer that the requested
commitment was for a period of eighteen months, the prosecutor asked the
court to inform Fabian A. as to the possibility of recommitment.31 In
response, Judge Wollenberg stated, “Well, if [the eighteen month
commitment] doesn’t work and something happens, you can be
recommitted, do you understand that?”32 Initially, Fabian A. failed to
respond verbally and the court instructed him that he must respond with a
“yes” or “no,” at which point he responded in the affirmative.33
Fabian A.’s commitment was set to expire on February 28, 2007.
However, as a result of his behavior while in custody, DCF filed a motion
to extend his commitment on January 29, 2007.34 Fabian A.’s attorney
opposed the motion to extend commitment, but on March 22, 2007 the
court granted the motion and extended Fabian A.’s commitment to January
19, 2008.35 The presiding Judge Gleeson found that at the time Fabian A.
had entered his guilty plea he had been “advised adequately as to the
possibility that his commitment could be extended.”36
Counsel for Fabian A. filed an appeal on April 9, 2007, asserting that
Fabian A.’s plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily because the
court had failed to properly inform the defendant of the circumstances that
may lead to an extension of his commitment. Namely, the court had only
inquired as to the sentence after accepting the guilty plea, the court “failed
to make any inquiry of [Fabian A.’s] understanding of the sentence, the
maximum penalty or the possibility of an extension,” and that it was “only
at the suggestion of the prosecutor, after the plea had been accepted, that
the court informed the defendant of a ‘recommitment possibility.’”37 Upon
reviewing the transcript from the plea canvass, the court held that Fabian
A. “could not have possessed an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts because the court, in canvassing him, did not include all the relevant
29

Id.
Id. Specifically, the court asked Fabian A. “his age, what grade he was in at school, if anyone
had forced him to plead guilty, if anyone had promised him anything if he pleaded guilty, whether his
attorney had informed him of how a trial would work and whether he was satisfied with the
representation of his attorney.”
31
Id. at 413–14 (emphasis added).
32
In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411, 414 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
30
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information concerning the commitment. As a result . . . the plea of the
respondent was not knowingly or voluntarily made.”38
C. The Defense’s Silence
The court in In re Jason C. established the rule that a juvenile’s plea
must be made knowingly and voluntarily; however, it failed to instruct
future courts as to what exactly is required to ensure that a juvenile is
indeed making his or her plea knowingly and voluntarily. Thus, it is no
surprise that the court found that Fabian A. had not been properly informed
of the circumstances that could lead to an extension of his commitment; as
a result, his plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily and was thus
invalid. It is important to note that, during the plea canvass, neither Fabian
A. nor his counsel asked any questions regarding commitment, and counsel
“did not make a motion to withdraw [the] guilty plea or in any other way
indicate that Fabian [A.] did not understand the judge’s advisement that his
commitment could be extended.”39
III. EVOLUTION OF DUE PROCESS IN THE JUVENILE SYSTEM
As this Note previously mentioned, there is a general movement in
both federal and state criminal justice systems towards extending many of
the protections of due process inherent in the adult system to the juvenile
justice system. Included in these protections are the right to counsel, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to reasonable
search and seizure, and the privilege against self-incrimination.40 There
seems to be a general consensus that the juvenile justice system requires a
balance between a strict application of due process rights in the juvenile
setting and judicial flexibility regarding procedural process, so long as
“constitutional demands are satisfied.”41 Although these rights are neither
identical to nor as extensive as those rights guaranteed to adult offenders,
they may be curtailed for legitimate reasons when doing so “serves the
state’s interests in promoting the health and growth of the child.”42
If we are to view the extension of due process protections to the
38

In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411, 417 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
Brief of Appellee at 5, In re Fabian A., 941 A.2d 411 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (No. 28704).
See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that children charged with criminal acts enjoy several procedural
protections). It is worth noting that, while there is a general consensus among most state courts that
juveniles should be afforded most of the due process protections afforded to similar adult offenders,
some states disagree that such an expansion of due process rights to juvenile offenders is warranted.
See, e.g., Petitioner F v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80, 90 (Ky. 2010) (holding that juvenile offenders are not
afforded all constitutional rights that adult offenders receive; instead, they should be afforded only
“right to fair treatment”).
41
47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 83 (2006).
42
Id.
39
40
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juvenile justice system as a realization of the necessity to protect the
“vulnerable dependents” within our society,43 it would necessarily follow
that protections outside of due process may be appropriate in the juvenile
system as well. This section will address the development and goals of the
juvenile justice system, as well as the concept of waiver generally. It will
ultimately argue that the rigidity associated with waiver in the adult
criminal justice system is incompatible with the goals of the juvenile
justice system – namely, the juvenile justice system was specifically
designed to be flexible and individualized, affording judges discretion not
only in their procedures, but in their sentences, so as to keep in line with
the system’s goals of not only punishment, but rehabilitation.44
A. History of the Juvenile Courts and Due Process in the Juvenile Justice
System
The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899, the direct
result of a progressive movement in the criminal justice system that
recognized the fundamental differences between adult and juvenile
offenders.45 The new court “combined the new conception of children as
vulnerable dependents with the rehabilitative orientation” of the
progressive movement.46 In the new juvenile court system, the state took
on a parens patriae role and, as such, “assessing criminal responsibility
became subordinate to assuring the social welfare of the child.”47 Because
the courts were viewed to be “benign” and implementing intervention
strategies in the children’s best interest, leaders of the progressive
movement “rejected the [adult] criminal law’s jurisprudence and
procedural safeguards” finding them to be unnecessary.48 Unfortunately,
juvenile courts frequently sentenced children to commitment in juvenile
institutions, often without the due process afforded to adult offenders who
faced the same deprivation of liberty.49 It is no surprise, then, that the lack
of procedural protections in the juvenile court system, combined with the
“sweeping custodial powers [afforded to] juvenile court judges,” soon
caught the eye of critics and judicial reformers.50
The most impressive reform of the juvenile court system occurred in
1964 after the annual meeting of the National Council of Juvenile Court
43

Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54
FLA. L. REV. 577, 586 (2002).
44
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121h (2011).
45
See Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 585–86.
46
Id. at 586.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 587 (citing Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court – Part II: Race and
the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 337–38 (1999)).
49
See Id.
50
Id.
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51

Judges. It was during this meeting that Chief Justice Earl Warren boldly
announced that, while great latitude is given to juvenile courts with regards
to procedure, decisions, and sentencing, those courts, like adult criminal
courts, “must function within the framework of the law and provide
juveniles with due process protection against capricious decisionmaking”
to “satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness . . . .”52
Though the Chief Justice failed to elaborate as to the specific
protections of due process which should apply in the juvenile setting, his
remarks served to refocus the goals of the juvenile system and opened the
door to decisions that very quickly began extending almost all of the due
process protections from adult criminal courts to those in the juvenile
system. The first of the cases to tackle the issue of due process in the
juvenile court system, thus marking a new era of juvenile justice, was In re
Gault.53 The Supreme Court, upon careful examination, observed that, in
the juvenile justice system, “the child receives the worst of both worlds:
. . . he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”54 Thus, in the
fundamental fairness guarantee, the court found the “jurisprudential basis
for affording the essential protections of the adult criminal process while
preserving the rehabilitative goals, confidentiality, and other benevolent
features of the juvenile court process.”55 The years following the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Gault saw a continued expansion of juveniles’ due
process rights and a restructuring of the juvenile court system so it more
closely resembled the adult system in terms of procedural process
protections. At the same time, the new juvenile courts remained distinct by
preserving the system’s original goals: flexibility, rehabilitation,
confidentiality, and other benevolent features unique to the juvenile
system.56
B. Goals of the Modern Juvenile Justice System
The United States Supreme Court, beginning with its decision in In re
Gault, acknowledged the inherent differences between the adult and
51

Id. at 588.
Id. at 588–89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gerald Gault was fifteen when he was adjudicated delinquent. The juvenile
court, in exercising the discretion afforded to it by the Arizona Juvenile Code, committed Gault to a
State Industrial School “for the period of his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of
law.” Id. at 7–8. The Supreme Court of Arizona found that the Code was invalid because it permitted
a juvenile to be committed to a state institution in proceedings in which the court had “virtually
unlimited discretion.” Id. at 10.
54
Id. at 18 n.23 (citing Kent v. US, 383 US 541, 556 (1966)).
55
Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the
Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 558 (1998).
56
See id; Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 593.
52
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juvenile justice systems, and emphasized that, where the goals of the adult
criminal justice system are deterrence and retribution, the goals of the
juvenile justice system should balance the goals of accountability with
those of rehabilitation and the best interest of the child.57
Connecticut, too, acknowledges the inherent differences between the
two systems, and, through its courts and legislature, has tried “to strike a
balance—to respect the informality and flexibility that characterize
juvenile proceedings . . . and yet to ensure that such proceedings comport
with the fundamental fairness demanded by the Due Process Clause.”58
The handling of juvenile matters in Connecticut exemplifies the “attempt
to balance fundamental fairness with the unique characteristics of the
juvenile justice system. . . .”59 According to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-121h,
the “juvenile justice system [is intended to] provide individualized
supervision, care, accountability and treatment in a manner consistent with
public safety to those juveniles who violate the law.”60 The statute
recognizes that, while one goal is to “[h]old juveniles accountable for their
unlawful behavior,” punishment must be balanced against efforts to
reintegrate the juvenile into society.61 The statute provides for “programs
and services that are community-based and are provided in close proximity
to the juvenile’s community,” seeks to “[r]etain and support juveniles in
their homes whenever possible and appropriate,” and “[p]romote[s] the
development and implementation of community-based programs including,
but not limited to, mental health services, designed to prevent unlawful
behavior and to effectively minimize the depth and duration of the
juvenile’s involvement in the juvenile justice system.”62 “Thus, it is clear
that [Conn. Gen. Stat.] § 46b-121h includes both rehabilitation and
accountability as desired goals of the juvenile justice system.”63
IV. WAIVER
As we have seen, the juvenile justice system emerged as separate and
distinct from the adult justice system with an eye towards rehabilitation of
minors, as opposed to mere punishment and retribution. The juvenile
system recognizes that the characteristics and needs of juvenile offenders
57
See In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710, 717 (Conn. 2001); Michelle Haddad, Catching Up: The Need
for New York State to Amend Its Juvenile Offender Law to Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional and
Normative National Trends Over the Last Three Decades, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 455,
457 (2009) (distinguishing the goals of the modern juvenile justice system from those of the adult
system).
58
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
59
In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710, 718 (Conn. 2001).
60
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121h (2011).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
In re Jason C., 767 A.2d at 717 n.12.
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are different than those of their adult counterparts, and as such juvenile
offenders require a separate system for the administration of justice.64
While the juvenile system is distinct from the adult system in terms of its
goals and enhanced judicial discretion, it has become increasingly similar
to the adult system in terms of its processes and procedural protections. As
the two systems become more similar, it raises questions as to whether the
juvenile justice system should not only adapt the protections afforded to
defendants in the adult system, but also other procedures inherent in the
adult system.
In considering this expansion of processes, it seems there would be a
split in opinion regarding an extension of the adult justice system’s
interpretation of actions or omissions on the part of the defendant that
might constitute a waiver of the right to bring up that issue at a later date.
One school of thought would argue that, because the courts have extended
due process, almost in its entirety, to the juvenile justice system and
applied its protections strictly, the juvenile courts should adopt the adult
system’s notion of waiver strictly as well. If a juvenile defendant has the
right to counsel, just as an adult does, should he not be able to waive his
right to counsel just as easily as an adult defendant? The other school of
thought regarding juvenile waiver would argue that in order to preserve the
fundamental fairness premise on which the juvenile justice system was
founded–flexibility–the adult system’s notion of waiver should be adopted,
but applied with judicial discretion. For example, where an adult
defendant’s silence regarding improper jury instructions may result in an
inability to object to the jury instructions on appeal, that claim may be
preserved where a juvenile defendant makes a similar omission.
A. Waiver, Generally
The adult procedure that lies at the heart of this Note’s analysis of the
juvenile justice system, generally, and of In re Fabian A., specifically, is
waiver. In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court held that the commonly
recognized test for waiver of any right is “ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”65 In order
to determine whether a defendant has validly waived a right requires that
the court determine the person’s knowledge or intent with regards to the
relinquishment of that right. Namely, “[t]he rights holder first must know
of the right and then make an intentional choice to relinquish it.
Otherwise, there is no waiver.”66 However, a look at the decisions of
64

See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 4 (2006).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957)
(extending the “competent and intelligent” standard to state court proceedings).
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Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 601.
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courts throughout the country, federal and state, adult and juvenile,
demonstrates that courts no longer adhere to the strict requirement that the
rights-holder explicitly or intentionally choose to waive the right in
dispute.
B. Waiver in Connecticut
In Connecticut, waiver is defined by not only the Connecticut Practice
Book, but also by the Connecticut judiciary. For example, the Connecticut
Practice Book is clear that, if an attorney fails to object or file a motion to
dismiss within a reasonable amount of time, he fails to preserve his claim
and is deemed to have waived his right to raise the issue at a later time
(generally, on appeal).67 Further, the “failure of a defendant not in
custody, absent good cause shown, to appear after notice, shall constitute a
waiver of that right and of any objection to the taking and use of the
deposition based upon that right.”68 Clearly the Connecticut Practice Book
deems a failure to positively act in a timely matter, be it filing a motion or
appearing in court, to be an implicit waiver of the right that would
otherwise be preserved. The Connecticut Supreme Court has held
similarly.69
However, the Connecticut courts have gone further to define specific
omissions on the part of counsel in adult proceedings as constituting
waiver. Namely, the Connecticut courts are in consensus in finding that a
failure to object or raise a claim–during trial or pretrial proceedings (more
specifically a plea canvass)–results in an inability to raise the claim at a
later point in time. For example, the Connecticut Appellate Court held that
an attorney’s failure to object to juror misconduct constitutes waiver.70
Furthermore, the Appellate Court also held that failing to object to a
court’s ruling constitutes waiver.71 The Connecticut courts have ruled
similarly in matters where a defendant’s fundamental rights are at issue.
For example, the Appellate Court held that, where defense counsel fails to
object to the State not proving each element of a crime, such omission

67

See CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 10-32 (deeming “[a]ny claim of lack of jurisdiction over the person
or improper venue or insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process [to be] waived if
not raised by a motion to dismiss filed” in a timely manner); see also CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 42-1
(stating that “a failure to elect a jury trial” at the time the court informs the defendant of his right to a
jury trial “may constitute a waiver of that right.”).
68
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 40-55.
69
See Kim v. Magnotta, 733 A.2d 809, 813 (Conn. 1999) (holding that lack of personal
jurisdiction may be waived, unless challenged by a motion to dismiss filed in a timely manner);
Lostritto v. Cmty. Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 848 A.2d 418, 431 (Conn. 2004) (holding that a
challenge to personal jurisdiction is waived if it is not raised in a motion to dismiss within 30 days of
the filing of a complaint).
70
State v. Tyson, 862 A.2d 363, 366 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
71
State v. Lynch, 1 A.3d 1254, 1263–64 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
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72

constitutes waiver. It later laid out the blanket rule that a defendant in
criminal prosecution may waive one or more of his fundamental rights.73
Most relevant to the case of In re Fabian A., however, is the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Golding that a failure on the part of a
defense attorney to object to jury instructions constitutes waiver.74 If we
are to read the Golding decision strictly, it would seem as though the
Connecticut courts do not require that a waiver be explicit, even in
situations where an objection may be directed towards the court’s
procedure.
So far, the courts in Connecticut have refused to extend the strict
interpretation of failure to object as constituting waiver from the adult
justice system to the juvenile system. However, it is worth noting that
implicit waiver is not a completely foreign notion within the Connecticut
juvenile justice system. In In re Adrien C., the Connecticut Appellate
Court held that a mother waived her right to contest the court’s jurisdiction
when she failed to comply with the thirty-day requirement for filing a
motion to dismiss the State’s claim.75 The Connecticut Superior Court
followed suit, holding that a mother’s failure to object to the late
scheduling of an initial hearing regarding the termination of her parental
rights “constitute[d] a waiver of any right she might have to do so.”76
Again, the court interpreted an adult’s failure to object as waiver.
However, what is still relevant is the court’s reasoning for interpreting
such omission as waiver. The court in In re Adrien C. emphasized, and the
court in In re Samantha B. reiterated, that the time restriction on filing a
motion to dismiss was the result of legislative concerns for delay in the
juvenile process and as a way to promote the best interest of the child
involved.77 Admittedly, there are vast differences between a juvenile
delinquency hearing and a termination of parental rights hearing; however,
a unifying theme between the two is the court’s attention to the best
interest of the child (or minor) involved.

72
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State v. Cooper, 664 A.2d 773, 777 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
State v. Hudson, 998 A.2d 1272, 1278 (Conn. App. 2010), cert. denied, 4 A.3d 1229 (Conn.
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State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1989). It is important to note that the Court’s decision
in Golding has narrow application. The Court stated that a failure to object will only constitute waiver
if four criteria are met: “(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is
of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional
violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 827.
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In re Adrien C., 519 A.2d 1241, 1245–46 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
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C. Waiver in Other Jurisdictions
There is a great weight of federal authority supporting the notion that,
by failing to object, defense counsel waives the right to pursue a claim on
appeal. For example, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Gagnon held that, in
the absence of an objection, the defendant had waived his right to be
present at all stages of his criminal trial.78 In Levine v. U.S., the Court held
that counsel’s failure to object to the closing of a courtroom was a waiver
of the right to a public trial.79 Finally, in U.S. v. Bascaro, the Eleventh
Circuit Court held that, because defendant raised the defense of double
jeopardy for the first time on appeal after failing to raise an objection to the
charges at trial, he had waived his right to assert such a defense.80 The
federal courts are clear regarding waiver in adult proceedings: unless
defense counsel makes an objection during trial (or during a pretrial
hearing), he is deemed to have waived the right to argue the specific
claim–no matter how fundamental a right the claim is asserting to protect–
at a later date.
State courts throughout the country generally follow the same rule and
accept that an adult defendant may implicitly waive various rights. The
Tennessee Supreme Court held in State v. Walker that a conspiracy
defendant’s failure to object at trial to the admission of his co-conspirator’s
statements made to the defendant’s sister constituted a waiver of his right
to raise the issue in his motion for a new trial.81 In State v. Gove, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the defendant had waived his right to
challenge on appeal that the trial court, in a witness unavailability ruling,
violated his right to confront his accuser when he failed to object to the
court’s ruling during trial.82 Finally, the Maryland Court of Appeals held
in Berry v. State that defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of
handgun evidence constituted a waiver of defendant’s right to raise the
evidence’s admission on appeal.83 State courts, like their federal
counterparts, rigidly interpret an attorney’s failure to object as constituting
waiver. But how rigidly should state juvenile courts apply the waiver
standard to a juvenile defense counsel’s failure to object?
Cases regarding waiver, implicit and explicit alike, in juvenile settings
are much more limited. However, the cases identified by this author seem
to point to a tendency among courts to strictly interpret juvenile defense
counsel’s initial failure to object as a waiver of the right to pursue the
claim at a later time. For example, the Utah Supreme Court held in State
78

U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985).
Levine v. U.S., 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960).
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ex rel. Christensen v. Christensen that a defendant waived his right to
object, on appeal, to the admission of testimony “as to matters which were
not embraced within the allegations of the petition for rehearing of the
case” because defense counsel “failed to object to the admission of such
testimony at the hearing.”84 In North Dakota, its Supreme Court held in In
the Interest of R.D.B. that a juvenile who was with his parents at the time
of a juvenile court proceeding effectively waived his right to counsel, and
that he “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived [his] right to
counsel at the adjudicatory hearing.” 85 The court went on to reject the
claim that a waiver of the right to counsel should be valid only when the
representation given by the parents is of the same caliber as the child
would have received from an attorney.86 Thus, the court emphasized that
the juvenile defendant’s waiver need not be explicit to prevent him from
objecting to inefficient or lack of counsel on appeal; rather, the mere
representation by his parents sufficiently constituted waiver.
D. Waiver of Counsel in the Juvenile Setting as a Model
Unfortunately, there seems to be no case law or statutory guidance for
determining whether defense counsel’s failure to object to an insufficient
plea canvass may constitute waiver in a juvenile court setting. However,
there has been extensive research conducted regarding implicit waiver with
regards to defendants’ right to counsel in juvenile delinquency hearings.
While the right to counsel derives more directly from due process
protections found in the Constitution, both the right to counsel and
informed consent affect whether a juvenile defendant receives a fair trial,
which is also a constitutionally-based right.
In her article The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the
Juvenile Courts, Mary Berkheiser refers to a myriad of “socialpsychological studies showing that most children are developmentally
incapable of exercising a valid waiver.”87 The studies reveal that
“juveniles as a class have limited decisionmaking abilities, lack an
adequate understanding of their legal rights, and as a result are incapable of
exercising an effective waiver.”88 If this inability on the part of juveniles
84
State ex rel. Christensen v. Christensen, 227 P.2d 760, 762–63 (Utah 1951). It is important to
note that this case was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault, which extended
procedural protections to the juvenile justice system. However, this decision is still good law in Utah
and is therefore a good example of how some states apply not only rigid adult procedural protections to
juvenile matters, but a rigid interpretation of failure to object as constituting waiver.
85
In re R.D.B., 575 N.W.2d 420, 423 (N.D. 1998).
86
Id.
87
Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 581.
88
Id. See generally Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of
17 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26 (2000); Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge’s Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a
Child’s Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873 (1996).
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to even explicitly waive their right to counsel is true, one can easily argue
that under no circumstances can a juvenile defendant implicitly waive his
right to counsel merely by failing to object to lack of counsel’s presence at
any stage of the judicial proceedings.
Further, the Connecticut Supreme Court often warned that judges
“should indulge ‘every reasonable presumption’ against waiver” where
defendants’ constitutional rights are at stake.89 “Yet juvenile court
practices as revealed in the reported cases [of waiver of right to counsel]
demonstrate a total disregard for that presumption.”90 As a result, there
have been many cases where juvenile court judges have found “waiver by
inaction.”91 For example, in In re Christopher T., when a juvenile
defendant showed up for his adjudication hearing without counsel, the
court inferred that he had waived his right to counsel and, as a result,
proceeded directly to adjudication.92 This trend of finding “waiver by
inaction” occurs even in states with detailed statutes that identify and limit
circumstances under which a judge may accept that a juvenile defendant
has waived his right to counsel. 93
There are many cases that indicate juvenile court judges have a
tendency to infer juvenile defendants’ waiver of their right to counsel “by
inaction.” However, there has been a trend among appellate courts to
reverse trial decisions based on an abuse of discretion by the trial court
judge in finding that the juvenile defendant had implicitly waived his right
to counsel.94 This trend is hopeful and it serves to reinforce the
fundamental principle of Gault that none of the due process protections it
mandated should undermine the beneficial qualities of juvenile court
proceedings.95 Taking this statement at face value, one may infer that the
Gault Court sought to strike a balance between strict application of due
process protections in all juvenile settings against the preservation of
judicial discretion to be used in situations that may not warrant such a rigid
89

Berkheiser, supra note 43, at 611.
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In re Christopher T., 740 A.2d 69, 71 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
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Id.
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Berkheiser, supra note 42, at 617. Berkheiser specifically focuses her analysis on Florida,
which has one of the most specific waiver rules of any state: “Rule 8.165 of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure requires the court to advise the child of his or her right to counsel and to appoint
counsel ‘unless waived by the child at each stage of the proceedings.’” Id. at 618. However, Florida
has one of the highest rates of appellate decisions overturning juvenile waiver of right to counsel based
on noncompliance with state statute. Id at 618, 661-60.
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See McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that, where the court had
informed the juvenile defendant’s mother of his right to counsel but failed to notify the defendant
himself, any waiver, by parent or child, must be “an intelligent, knowing act”); Shioutakon v. District
of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 670, 670 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding that “where the [right to counsel]
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the child’s “age, education, and information, and all other pertinent facts”).
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application of the due process doctrine.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING STRICT WAIVER RULES TO
THE JUVENILE SYSTEM
As the previous section illustrated, courts throughout the country,
including those in Connecticut, are relatively unanimous in their decisions
interpreting an attorney’s failure to object as a waiver of the right to raise
the claim in later proceedings. This interpretation of attorney silence as
waiver holds true not just in adult adjudicatory settings, but in the juvenile
justice system, as well. So I pose the question: Should it?
A. Recommendations for Connecticut
It is clear that the divide in opinion regarding a strict application of
waiver to the juvenile justice system may have an impact on the system’s
procedural flexibility and general attainment of its goals. For example, as
applied to In re Fabian A., if we are to strictly adhere to the adult justice
system’s notions of waiver, Fabian A.’s attorney would be deemed to have
waived his client’s right to an appeal based on the fact that he failed to
object to the judge’s insufficient canvass. As a result his client’s plea was
not made knowingly or voluntarily. However, if we are to adopt a more
lenient interpretation of waiver in the juvenile justice system (as would be
in line with the system’s generally flexible character), one might argue that
in order for a minor to waive his right to an appeal, the waiver must be
explicit, rather than a mere failure to object. In this case, Fabian A.’s right
to an appeal would be preserved, regardless of the fact that his attorney
failed to object to the deficient canvass.
So what is Connecticut to do? Unfortunately, “neither the presumption
against waiver nor the enactment of detailed statutory waiver procedures
have been effective constraints against juvenile court judges’ continued
exercise of their ‘discretion’ to deny juveniles their right to counsel.”96
This statement illustrates the catch-22 that lies at the heart of the juvenile
justice system: on one hand, judicial discretion preserves the flexibility and
individualized attention upon which the juvenile justice system was
founded; on the other hand, judicial discretion allows a judge to ignore
statutory due process requirements, such as right to counsel, under the
guise of addressing the child’s best interest. The latter instance is quite
distressing. For that reason, I would recommend that Connecticut not only
pass a statute that implements a strict no-waiver policy, unless the waiver
is explicit and made in writing, but also go a step further and include in it
the threat of sanctions against any judge that violates the no-waiver policy.
96
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Though such a rigid, and arguably severe, rule goes against juvenile justice
notions of flexibility and discretion, such a statute may counteract the
possible abuse of discretion by juvenile court when deciding whether to
preserve a defendant’s claim by placing judges who abuse their discretion
at risk of sanctions.
B. Implications for In re Fabian A.
The United States Supreme Court and legal scholars alike have long
recognized that “the right to counsel is fundamental to the exercise of other
procedural rights by those accused of criminal acts. As early as 1932, the
Court stated that without the ‘guiding hand of counsel,’ an accused’s ‘right
to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail.’”97 Unfortunately, as
seen in the case of Fabian A., counsel is not always adequate or effective in
advocating and protecting a juvenile defendant’s best interest and
fundamental rights.
As I recommended in the previous section,
Connecticut juvenile courts should move away from the national state
court trend of rigidly interpreting counsel’s failure to object as a waiver,
and instead allow for judicial discretion in instances where counsel’s
failure to object carries with it the potential for the juvenile defendant’s
deprivation of liberty after entering a plea that is neither knowing nor
voluntary.98 If Connecticut courts were to afford juvenile judges greater
discretion, there is a chance that a court hearing Fabian A.’s case on appeal
may allow the juvenile defendant to pursue the claim that his guilty plea
was made neither knowingly nor voluntarily. However, if the court
disallows Fabian A. to pursue his claim (even in a judicial system that
requires explicit waiver rather than a mere failure to object), he may be
able to pursue an alternative course of action and bring a claim against his
attorney for ineffective counsel. Allowing such a claim would not only
encourage juvenile defense attorneys to be more attentive during plea
canvasses (especially in the case of Fabian A., where defense counsel even
failed to object to the canvass after the prosecuting attorney raised the
issue of insufficiency), but may also allow juvenile defendants who would
otherwise not be able to appeal an extension of commitment to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of the juvenile justice system is defined by dueling
opinions as to how juvenile defendants should be treated. At its inception,
the “juvenile court replicated the historical parens patriae practice of the
courts of chancery in England and the United States to exercise jurisdiction
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for the protection of the unfortunate child[,]” focusing on benevolence and
intervention as opposed to punishment and retribution.99 Because their
focus was on a child’s best interest, rather than merely locking him or her
up and throwing away the key, early juvenile courts saw the due process
procedural protections inherent to adult courts as unnecessary in their
newly-established judicial sphere.100 Judicial reformers challenged the
view that, because the juvenile court was a benevolent parent, focused on
serving the juvenile defendant’s best interest. They pointed out that, in
reality, the juvenile court system afforded children “fewer rights under the
law, based on the children’s presumed lack of capacity to exercise good
judgment.”101 As such, the juvenile court system began a procedural
movement increasingly similar to its adult counterpart, specifically by
adapting due process protections inherent in the adult system.
The divide between the adult and juvenile court systems has been
gradually narrowing as juvenile courts continue to adapt procedural
protections and procedural rigidity. An examination of courts across the
country shows a clear trend among juvenile judges to rigidly apply adult
procedure regarding failure to object and implicit waiver. This trend is
incongruous with the fundamental premises upon which the juvenile
system is based–flexibility and fundamental fairness. As a result, juvenile
defendants–whom the courts have identified as not only unique from their
adult counterparts but who may also lack the capacity and maturity to fully
understand their legal situation or consequences–are often deprived of
many rights and opportunities a less rigid and more discretionary system
might—and should—afford them.
By analyzing the history of the juvenile justice system and tracking
court trends regarding due process and waiver, this Note attempted to
address the issues raised by the Connecticut Superior Court in the case of
In re Fabian A. While it is, as of now, unclear which way the court will
rule on the basis of waiver, the decision either way will be a watershed
decision regarding Connecticut courts’ stance on the rigid interpretation of
absence of objection as constituting waiver.
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